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The Argument.
The theme of what follows is, in brief, (a) that Reason 
may be regarded as the capacity of an individual to adapt 
his behaviour to the conditions of real life, (b) that at a 
certain stage in the evolution of man real life consists of 
group or common life, in which there is invariably found a 
code of moral regulations, and (c) that at this stage it is 
still Reason which marks the capacity of an individual to 
observe these moral regulations, without which group life 
itself is impossible. It is suggested, therefore, that to 
be moral and to be reasonable reflect the same fundamental 
capacity in human beings, that is, the capacity of adapting 
one’s behaviour to the facts of real life. On this hypo- 
-thesis, it is claimed, the conceptions of ethical theory 
are freed from much of their traditional obscurity, the 
opposed schools of ethical thought in the past are more 
readily intelligible, and the significance of morality it- 
-self can be envisaged from a new, but legitimate and fruit- 
-ful, standpoint.
Chapter I.
THE APPROACH TO EIHIOS.
■ 1.
Ethloa and Group Life*
If it is life in general which supplies philosophy with 
its problems, it seems to be group life more particularly 
from which originate the questions of Ethics, It is only 
because human beings, at a certain stage in their history, 
come to live together in groups that Ethics achieves its 
place in the sun at all. The size of the group may of 
course vary considerably, from a mere family, or enlarged 
tribal family, to a civic community, or even a great civil- 
-ized nation. But, independently of size, it is the mere 
fact that some type of group life is being maintained which 
accounts for the emergence of something specifically ethical. 
Primitive taboos, rites, ceremonies, as well as the customs 
and laws and conventions of organised communities, are all 
concerned, in the last analysis, with the relations between 
members of a group. It is the existence and maintenance of 
the group which bring them into being, and it is only in re- 
-ference to this group that their development and significance
can be understood.
There are, it is clear, many questions which are suggested 
by the fact of group life itself. Sociologists, for in- 
-stance, may attempt to reconstruct the historical stages of 
group-evolution, surmising perhaps a primitive horde as the 
earliest form of human association. Philosophers, again, 
may seek to explain the ultimate origin of group life, sur- 
-mising perhaps a primitive 'social contract' as its source. 
Psychologists may refer for their part to a 'herd instinct' 
or to some similar native disposition in man, in terms of 
which social life is supposed to explain itself. But all 
such questions reach out into territory lying beyond Ethies 
proper. Ethics is concerned with the accomplished fact of 
group life, rather than with its antecedents, historical, 
philosophical, or psychological. For it is on the emerg- 
-enee of group life that the content of Ethics first comes 
into being.
The explanation of the complete dependence of Ethics on 
group life is simply that moral restraint on the part of 
the individual is necessary for common life to be possible 
at all. It is clear, too, that individuals, if they accept 
certain restrictions on their behaviour, if they postpone or 
deny the gratification of certain of their impulses, if they 
adapt their conduct generally to the prevailing customs of 
their group, are enabled in this way, and in this way alone,
to attain, ultimately, the greatest satisfaction of their own 
desires. Indeed it is difficult to see how a group could 
begin to function, much less survive for any length of time, 
if each member in it followed lawlessly the immediate gratif- 
-ieation of his every craving. It was pointed out by 
Socrates, long ago, that even a band of robbers could not 
maintain itself as an efficient unit unless each member of 
the band accepted some restriction on his very lawlessness#
"If they had been perfectly evil", Socrates remarks, "they 
would have laid hands upon one another: but it is evident
there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which 
enabled them to combine." (Republic of Plato, p.332C) What 
Socrates means by 'justice', in this context, is not justice 
in the narrow sense of impartial or fair distribution, but 
justice as the most general principle of morality. It would 
seem, then, that a code of morals is necessarily bound up 
with the maintenance of some group, and that group life itself 
is only possible if the members of the group observe in their 
conduct certain moral restraints, however elementary these 
may be. Whatever the full significance of Ethics may show 
itself eventually to be, morality can be said to cbnstitute, 
at the very least, one condition without which social life is 
impossible.
The actual fact of social or common life is of course 
seldom called into question. As Mill whites, "The social
State is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual 
to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an 
effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself 
otherwise than as a member of a body." (J.8.Mill, Utilitar- 
-iaaism. Chap.Ill) But it is important for Ethics to place 
the fact in the very forefront of its analysis, and to re- 
-oognise as a consequence that even the simplest moral judg- 
-ment has a social reference. If it were conceivable that 
a human being could live wholly by himself, and for himself, 
never entering into relations with any other living creature, 
it would be quite meaningless to describe his conduct as 
'good* or 'bad*, 'right' or 'wrong', 'moral' or 'immoral'.
If the conduct, in other words, does not affect other living 
beings, there is no standard by which it can be morally app- 
-raised. Even the preservation of the individual's life, 
which some of his actions, such as the storage of food, might 
aid, could not be judged 'good' or 'moral' unless it affected 
the lives of other beings. It is only in a setting of, or 
with an implied reference to, some group or community that 
moral predicates can be legitimately applied to the behaviour 
of individuals. In short, the dependence of morals on group 
life constitutes the foundation, as it is the natural point 
of departure, for all enquiry into the significance of Ethics.
2.
Ethics as Philosophical.
Ethics is apparently, at first glance, an empirical or 
inductive science. Its business is to collect the various 
facts about morality, to classify the different kinds of 
moral customs which have been practised by different peoples 
in past ages, to present, in short, what Taylor called a 
'Phenomenology of Morals', for subsequent critical analysis 
and reflection. Such an empirical survey should lead to 
conclusions of great general importance. If it is found, 
for instance, that every known code forbids one individual 
to kill another in the same group, freely, in pursuit of 
private lust for blood, it may be inferred that the prohib- 
-ition of murder is a fundamental moral law. Or if it is 
established by historical records that certain moral practices 
have been accompanied by the prosperity or cultural develop- 
-ment of a group, while other practices have apparently been 
followed by the degeneration or even extinction of the group, 
it may be inferred that the conception of moral 'progress’ is 
a valid one, and that to attempt to trace an evolution in 
morals is more than a merely interesting exercise in imagin- 
-ative creation. Such hypotheses, indeed, may well be the 
o^ly scientific way in which the mass of available data can 
be resumed or classified.
But Ethics as an empirical science has its limitations. 
All the above survey of morals leaves out of its purview 
what is really the main problem of Ethics. That problem, 
to which everything else is preliminary merely, or subsid- 
-iary, is simply, What is the significance of the fact that 
there are moral codes at all? It is this question which 
constitutes the real crux of ethical theory. The empirical 
survey is of secondary importance. Perhaps its chief in- 
-terest lies in its bearing on history and sociology, for it 
offers a clue to the general conditions under which human 
societies have flourished or languished in the past, a clue 
which some historians of civilization have tended to ignore. 
The main task of Ethics, however, is something other than 
this. It is directed not simply to the collation of diff- 
-erent moral codes, but to the explanation of the fact that 
there are moral codes in existence at all. What, for in- 
-8tance, does that fact indicate about the nature of man? 
Does it imply his possession of a 'moral sense', of a 'soul', 
does it imply his 'free-will'? Does it point to the ne- 
-cessity of a social setting for the realisation of life?
If reflection suggests, as it sometimes appears to do, that 
the effort to carry out some moral purpose, the struggle to 
win a victory over selfish Impulse or passion, are among the 
most poignant features of the whole of experience, is there
here a clue to the ultimate significance of human life or 
to the character of human destiny? What, too, does the 
fact of morality imply with regard to the world, or with re- 
-gard to Reality?
It is in questions of this kind, than, that the philos- 
-ophical aspect of Ethics most clearly emerges. To reflect 
on the fact of morality, to estimate what place in the scheme 
of things is occupied by the moral life, is necessarily to 
touch on the most ultimate problems of philosophy. That is 
why Ethics, traditionally, is bound up with Metaphysics. In 
the greatest ethical teachers, in Plato, in Spinoza, in Kant, 
Ethics and Metaphysics constitute a single philosophical con- 
-struction. Often, indeed, it has been in the fact of the 
moral life that a solution to some metaphysical impasse has 
been finally won. Even in Pragmatism, where abstractions 
such as Truth or Reality are held to be dependent for their 
meaning on the ends of practical life, "the foundations of 
metaphysics are actually found to lie in ethics", Schiller 
writes. (Humanism, p.10) In other words, "Pragmatism 
awards to the ethical conception of Good supreme authority 
over the logical conception of True and the metaphysical con- 
-ception of Real... Our apprehension of the Real. our com- 
-prehension of the True, is always effected by beings who 
are aiming at the attainment of some Good." (ibid.p.8)
There is, then, quite clearly, a legitimate philosophical 
standpoint in Ethics. The fact of morality is what is 
given. The task of Ethics is to interpret that fact, in 
terms of human nature and human capacities, if that he poss- 
-ible, but above all to envisage the fact in its widest 
philosophical implications.
This does not mean, it should be added, that Ethics as 
philosophical is a product of abstract thought, an à priori 
construction of the mind, which is independent of the actual 
data of moral history. The description of Ethics as a norm- 
-%tive science often carries with it this misleading suggest- 
-ion. It is implied that reflection presents us with some 
'norm' or standard of its own, not connected with the facts 
of existing moral systems. This norm or ideal then ranks as 
a higher kind of entity than the mere facts of the moral 
life, and Ethics has a tendency to become remote or trans- 
-cendental. Such a result, however, is wholly due to verbal 
abstraction, to what James called 'vicious intellectualisa'. 
There are actions which are called 'good', and it is conven- 
-ient to frame an abstract conception of 'goodness' for fac- 
-ility in discussing these actions. But 'goodness' remains 
an abstract conception. It is not a real entity, from which 
can be logically deduced conclusions regarding actual facts 
in the world. The ideals, or norms, or laws of Ethics,
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therefore, are the product of reflection, but they are 
reached inductively, from the study of past and present 
moral codes, just as the laws of physical science are reached 
from the study of the material universe. There i& a phil- 
-osophical standpoint in Ethics, an attempt to discover the 
ultimate significance of Ethics ; but it proceeds from the 
concrete facts of morality, not from the purely logical im- 
-plications of abstract concepts. Ethics, in short, may set 
up an ideal or norm, but that ideal should be a type of actual 
life, to be tested by such knowledge as is possessed both of 
human nature and of the world with which that nature is in 
relation.
Ethics and Psychology.
Since moral regulations apply to the conduct or behaviour 
of men, and there is a special science of human behaviour, 
psychology, it is natural to approach ethical enquiry by 
seeking to discover its relation to the more general, psy- 
-chological standpoint. It is difficult, however, to state 
just which part of behaviour belongs to Ethics, and which 
admits only of psychological analysis. There is probably no 
acceptable line of rigid demarcation# The traditional
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ascription of 'voluntary* action to Ethics and reflex or in- 
-stinotive action to psychology rests on a classification of 
conduct which is no longer tenable. It is in fact the oon- 
-text of an action which really determines whether or not 
there is an ethical colouring: and almost every conceivable 
action, even a cough or a gesture, may in some specific con- 
-text have genuine moral significance. In other words, it 
is what was called above the 'social reference' of an action 
on which depends, ultimately, the possibility of moral 
criticism.
The exact distinction, then, between ethical conduct and 
that which is only psychological may be left in this general 
form for the present. What emerges as quite indisputable 
is the one fact that moral behaviour, whatever else can be 
said about it, is in the first instance human behaviour. The 
moral life, it is evident, takes place within a psychological 
framework or setting. It occurs under conditions which are 
fixed by the nature of the human agent. It is because of 
this that the approach to the interpretation of morals may 
be said to lie most naturally by way of psychology.
It is necessary to indicate, however, just how much this 
implies. It implies, for instance, that there are certain 
psychological prolegomena, certain preliminary facts about 
the nature of man, about the conditions under which his
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moral life proceeds, which are relevant to Ethics. These 
conditions may be perhaps compared to the rules by which a 
game is conducted. It is not implied in the least, however, 
that the psychological analysis of behaviour can yield a 
complete explanation of its moral character, any more than 
the physiological or neural analysis of a man's movements 
will explain why he goes for a walk. To examine the psy- 
-chological setting within which moral behaviour takes place 
merely constitutes a useful, relevant, but preliminary task. 
It is like reading the rules of a game before beginning to 
test the possibilities of the game in actual practice. It 
is, in fact, to glance at the technical, material means by 
which moral achievement is made possible, just as through a 
bow and the strings of a violin there may be realised the 
exquisite beauty of a musical composition.
Traditionally, there is a certain body of psychological 
doctrine which has played an important part in the analysis 
of moral behaviour. There is, for instance, the fundamental 
dualism of body and soul, flesh and spirit, sensuous desire 
and reason. Conceptions such as those of the 'will', the 
'appetites', the 'rational self', have bulked largely in 
ethical description. The springs of action have been re- 
-garded as the 'desire for pleasure', or as 'self-love*, or 
even as 'benevolence'. Loose expressions have constantly
13
been used with reference to the 'play of motives', the force 
of 'habit', the realisation of 'ends' or 'purposes', and even 
the conception of a supreme end or 'summum bonum*. All such 
language, it is very evident, conceals a mass of psychological 
hypotheses, not all of which are compatible with the present 
findings of psychology itself. It seems probable, therefore, 
that there may be found in the progress and refinement of 
recent psychological analysis an important clue, at any rate, 
to a clearer understanding of the moral life. Progress in 
psychology, it seems, must ultimately be reflected in the 
outlook of Ethics too.
It is indeed from recent psychological analysis that the 
main stimulus to reconstruction of Ethics comes. The 
traditional conceptions which form the basis of ethical 
theory have been modified considerably in recent years, as 
the result of at least three distinct phases of psychological 
work. These are as follows:-
(a) The study of instinct in human beings and of its 
function in determining behaviour (notably, among English 
writers, by Graham Wallas, Drever, and IVIcDougall) has offered 
a challenge to the belief that Reason is the supreme arbiter 
of human conduct. The instincts, according to McDougall, 
are "the sources of energy, which set the ends and sustain 
the course of all human activity", while intellectual or
14
rational processes are but "the servants, instruments, or 
means" of these instinctive forces. (McDougall, Social Psy- 
-Ghology, p.3) In other words, it is the instincts, it is 
claimed, which are the prime movers of human actions, the raw 
material of human character, whereas Reason enters only at a 
later stage, to justify what has been carried through by some 
instinctive driving power. The ethical problem, therefore, 
is not, as was so long imagined, to explain how rational 
beings sometimes act immorally, or unreasonably, but rather 
to explain how creatures endowed with the strongest egoistic 
impulses ever come to act morally or reasonably at all.
(b) Again, the theories associated with Freud and Psycho- 
-analytio doctrine have suggested that human behaviour is 
sometimes the expression of ’unconscious' wishes, that is, 
wishes which are not acknowledged by the conscious, waking 
self, but which have been 'repressed' to a different system 
of the mind, where they still function actively. Character- 
-traits, too, on this theory, often go back for their ex- 
-planation to features of the earliest development of the 
individual which are now unconscious. It is evident, then, 
that the place of Reason in human conduct recedes still 
further on such a view, and that the whole question of moral 
responsibility appears in a new, and apparently destructive, 
light. Man's ethical or cultural attainments now show
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themselves to be merely a thin and easily broken through 
veneer. The under-layers of primitive egoism and crudity, 
so far from having been destroyed by education, are held to 
be continuously active in each one of us, seeking an outlet 
in all kinds of displaced or substituted forms.
(c) Finally, the psychology which flourishes in America 
under the designation of 'Behaviorism', and which was mainly 
associated at its inception with J.B.Watson, attempts to 
interpret human conduct without having recourse to the oon- 
-ceptions of 'conscious' purpose or motive at all. The 
traditional notion of 'desire' (as involving consciousness 
of an object and the recognition of the object as a good) 
is clearly unable to survive this kind of psychology. Desire 
becomes, as in Bertrand Russell's exposition of the creed,
"a characteristic of a certain series of movements or 
behaviour-cycle", and the initial stimulus to such a cycle 
is an impulsion from behind, not an attraction from the 
future, such as is implied in the notion of 'consciousness 
of an end'. A complete Ethics in terms of Behaviorism will 
no doubt be one of the curiosities of philosophical liter- 
-atuye in the near future.
These distinct tendencies, then, in current psychological 
work have combined to make necessary some general re-casting 
of the traditional prolegomena to Ethics. Ho hard and fast
16
dividing line can now be drawn, apparently, between purely
instinctive conduct, on the one hand, and voluntary or rat-
—ional conduct, on the other* The whole account of the
springs of action requires re-statement • The traditional
doctrine on this subject, if not so much dead weight handed
on from one text-book to another, has at least to be modified
in quite essential respects* Perhaps the most convenient
beginning in this task is to be found in the examination of
a conception recently introduced into modem psychology,
the conception, namely, of what is called the Reality-
-Principle. What connection has this conception with moral 
behaviour?
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Chapter II.
MORAL COHDÜCT AHD THE) REALITY-PRIHCIPLE.
1.
The Reality and Pleasure Princinles.
A person's behaviour is said to be in conformity with 
the Reality-principle when it is, in ordinary language, 
sensible or practical: that is, when the person does not
act to satisfy some purely selfish impulse, which urges in- 
-sistently for its immediate gratification, but behaves in a 
way which at once allows for the claims of other people and 
takes cognisance of the actual situation in which the person 
finds himself. If a clerk has only £1, for instance, in 
his possession, with no prospect of any addition to his 
financial resources for a week, and has to pay for his meals 
separately during the intervening days, it would not be con- 
-forming to the Reality-principle to spend ten shillings on 
a single meal, to satisfy some momentary extravagant impulse. 
However delightful the satisfaction of this impulse, the be- 
-haviour is properly regarded as foolish or unpractical.
But human beings are so constituted that they find it, in
18
the beginning at any rate, difficult to follow the Reality-
-principle. In the first years of its life a child follows
it very little at all. It follows rather what is called 
the Pleasure-prinoiole. Its behaviour, in other words, is
directed to the immediate satisfaction of every impulse as it 
arises, and its actions are determined by very little else 
than the strength of these impulses at each particular moment, 
It is the nature of the world in which the child finds itself 
that prevents the unbroken dictatorship of the Pleasure-
-principle. That world is such that impulses cannot always
be satisfied as soon as they arise. A limit is set to the 
sway of the Pleasure-principle not only by the claims of 
other people but by the resistance of the physical environ- 
-ment of the child. It is this limit or check which thus 
gives birth to the Reality-principle.
The latter, however, is evidently not so much a new or 
different kind of principle as a transformed, modified, or 
more complicated edition of the Pleasure-principle. It is 
an edition or version, too, which comes eventually to replace 
the older form. The way in which this replacement is 
effected can best be described in the words of Freud, to whom 
the use of these psychological conceptions in the first in- 
-stance belongs. "The Ego learns", Freud writes, "that it 
must inevitably go without immediate satisfaction, postpone
19
gratification, learn to endure a degree of pain, and alto- 
-gether renounce certain sources of pleasure. Thus trained, 
the Ego...is no longer controlled by the Pleasure-principle, 
but follows the Reality-principle, which at bottom also seeks
pleasure --  although a delayed and diminished pleasure, one
which is assured by its realization of fact, its relation to 
Reality." (Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 
p.299) In another work Freud expresses his view in this 
way. The Reality-principle, he writes, "without intending 
to renounce the ultimate attainment of pleasure, demands and 
carries through the postponement of satisfaction... as a long 
detour towards pleasure." (Freud, Beyond The Pleasure- 
-Principle, p.3)
It is, however, only after long training, which extends 
far into adult life, that an individual can reach the stage 
of acting habitually in accordance with the Reality-principle. 
Hot until then, indeed, is he fitted to take his place in 
the community to which he belongs, as a socialised, moralised 
being. Some of a person's impulses, notably in modem 
societies those connected with the sexual instincts, undergo 
certain important developments in their conflict with the 
Reality-principle. They may prove of such exceptional 
strength that they even follow crudely the Pleasure-principle 
throughout most of the person's life. Or they may be
20
diverted from their original goal so as to subserve some 
social or cultural end. All native impulses, however, re- 
-sist the domination of the Reality-principle at grave peril 
to the welfare of the individual. For to follow the Reality, 
-principle is not simply dictated by prudence. It is vital 
to the wellbeing, and indeed the survival, of the individual.
So adapt oneself to the facts of Reality, to recognise 
that the world has certain stubborn qualities, has a kind of 
inner law or Necessity, against which psychic activity, such 
as wishing or imagining, is in itself impotent, is quite 
imperative, if the individual is to maintain himself alive at 
all. He cannot stand out against the inexorable laws and 
properties of the real world, and survive. Just as, from 
the standpoint of biology, the maintenance of life depends on 
successful adjustment to the physical environment, so, from 
the somewhat wider standpoint suggested here, recognition of 
the facts or conditions of the real social medium in which a 
person lives is what determines the existence of that person 
as a competent unit in a civilized community. If he Insists 
on gratifying his every impulse in flagrant defiance of the 
claims of other people or in wilful blindness to the actual 
facts of real life, the social group to which he belongs will 
remove or destroy him. For society cannot tolerate in its 
adult members an egoism too markedly childish: and a certain
21
minimum of conformity to the Reality-principle is the in- 
-dispensahle condition on which participation in the social 
enterprise is alone rendered possible for mankind.
2 .
The Concent of Pleasure.
It should be added here, perhaps, that while these con- 
-eeptions of the Pleasure and Reality principles, as thus 
used, offer a convenient description of behaviour control, 
they are not an altogether exact statement of the facts. A 
loose uSfLge of the expression ' Pleasure-principle ', for in- 
-stance, may suggest that the doctrine of Hedonism is being 
expounded. This is not, however, implied. Strictly, the 
principle which has been called Pleasure-principle should be 
called the Impulse-satisfaction principle. The concept of 
'pleasure* is an abstraction. It is the name given to a 
certain tone, or affective character, which is experienced in 
some types of activity. Its presence, as Aristotle suggests, 
is a sign of successful functioning on the part of the 
organism. As McDougall expresses it, "The correlation of 
pleasure with success or with progress toward the end of 
action, and of displeasure with failure and thwarting of 
action, must be accepted as fundamental, an ultimate fact of
22
mind, as ultimate as Newton's laws of motion or the gravit- 
-ation of matter." (MoDougall, An Outline of Psychology, p.
191)
It is not, then, the search for plSMaZS. which is a fund- 
-amental principle of behaviour, but the tendency to satisfy 
impulses, or to relieve the tension which an unsatisfied 
impulse involves. It is only the fact that such relief of 
tension is marked by pleasurable tone, that it constitutes in 
fact what is meant by pleasure, which makes it possible to 
regard pleasure itself as the end of activity. The expression 
'Pleasure-principle', then, is an example of this convenient, 
but strictly inaccurate, usage. It must be emphasised, 
therefore, that no theory of Hedonism is implied by the above 
adoption of the expression. The distinction between follow- 
-ing the Pleasure-principle and following the Reality- 
-principle is to be more accurately described as the dis- 
-tinction between satisfying impulses directly, immediately, 
by purely psychical means if possible, and satisfying impulses 
only to the extent that their satisfaction is compatible with 
the facts of the world and the claims of other.people.
It is in this sense, then, that the conception of the 
Pleasure-principle should alone be understood. The concept- 
-ion of the Reality-principle requires elucidation also, and 
to a much greater extent, for it raises still more important 
difficulties of its own.
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3.
The Conoeut of Reality.
The conception 'Reality-principle' raises more difficult 
questions, because it is the concept of Reality round which 
centres the fundamental problem of Metaphysics. Is it valid, 
that problem runs, to refer to "the facts and conditions of 
the world in which one lives" as Reality? Are these facts 
and conditions objective entities, existing independently of 
human activity or perception, or are they themselves not 
simply products of that activity ? Are the laws and pro- 
-perties of molecules, as reached by physical or chemical 
science, real truths, or are they not just formulations, 
hypotheses, conjectures, in short, subjective constructions 
determined wholly by the principles of the human understand- 
-ing? It is evident that the use of the concept of Reality 
conceals certain definite metaphysical assumptions: and it
is necessary to make these explicit before an ethical theory 
is developed which rests on them as a basis. In what sense, 
then, is it valid to use the concept of Reality?
Everything we can predicate in life is at least mediated, 
in virtue of its being predicated, by our mental apparatus: 
and it would seem that an analysis of mental process must be 
the first step towards determining the function of the concept
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of Reality. Row if we try to describe the existence with 
which we have immediate acquaintance, and reconstruct, on 
the basis of introspection, the inner character of our mental 
life, we can find no more expressive image than that of a 
flow or stream of activity, a 'continuous flux', in Bergson's 
phrase, of processes which are called psychical. This flow 
of activity is the inner functioning, of which our observable 
behaviour is taken to be the outward expression. It is 
activity which is felt, or experienced, or'enjoyed', in the 
technical sense, and represents to us the working and the 
pattern of what is called the life-impulse. The activity, 
if we examine it, seems to move in obedience to an inner 
tension of the organism, and is directed to the diminution 
or removal of that tension. The tension may be a comparat- 
-ively simple one, such as hunger or thirst, or it may be 
exceedingly complex, such as the vague longings of an artist 
in the throes of creation. Partial or complete success in 
removing tension is reflected in a lightening of effort, to 
which, as we saw above, the name 'pleasurable' is given.
In less exact, but more familiar terms, we may say that the 
activity is directed to satisfying the wants of the organism, 
these wants being, in the first instance, the instinctive 
impulses, the primary biological needs, of the individual.
How at what is probably an early point in the flow of
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this activity-stream there makes itself introduced a certain 
resistance to what was hitherto a smoothly-flowing, even 
movement. Psychical activity, however much repeated, varied, 
or stressed, finds itself unable to remove certain tensions. 
The summoning of all its resources, for instance, in reviving 
former satisfaction-of-hunger-activity, to call it|so, will 
not of itself remove a present hunger-tension. In other 
words, psychical activity is very soon punctuated by certain 
checks, or impediments, in its flow, and these checks (in 
spite of the truth behind Auto-Suggestion doctrine) may prove 
stubborn, unyielding, intractable. On the emergence of every 
such check the flow of the activity-stream undergoes some 
alteration, some change of direction: some increase of ten-
-sion, it may be, and consequent stress, or, eventually, some 
diminution of tension and the resumption of the smooth pro- 
-gression of the activity-stream along its own path to the 
attainment of its goal.
A distinction thus forces itself into the child's exper- 
-ience, at an early point, between two characteristics of 
its activity-stream. That stream, on the one hand, flows 
evenly along on some occasions, without a break in its 
tenour, without resistance to its movement. It is charact- 
-erised, on the other hand, by periodic checks or impediments, 
which, while themselves merging into its flow, do not fit
26
into it as smoothly and aocomodatingly as the remainder. In 
this distinction there is foreshadowed the later clear-cut 
division of an 'inner' world of psychical processes, a world 
of psychical reality, and an 'outer' world of physical oh- 
-jects, a world of physical or material reality. What has 
happened, it seems, is that the activity-stream finds it 
convenient, perhaps imperative, to project these impediments 
or intractable features in its flow. It conceives them as 
'outside' itself, and later (though very much later) as in- 
-dependent of itself.
When,the child begins to reflect, he seeks to understand 
the source of these 'independent' phases of his experience. 
In sojj^ ar as he has reached the conception of a 'source' by 
attributing the inner flow of psychical activity to himself, 
(originally in the third person, it is to be noted, as the 
result of imitation), he proceeds to attribute these outer 
or independent features of the flow to ot%er selves, and 
regards them as the activity of beings or organisms similar 
to himself in every respect. Everything hypostasized in 
this way is conceived, at first, as alive, human, animate. 
The toys of the child, the physical environment of the 
savage, are all endowed with the properties and functions of 
human beings. But later reflection conceives some elements 
to be inanimate objects, or 'things'. At a still more
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sophisticated stage of knowledge these may be described as
'forces' or 'ethereal vibrations' or 'stimuli which impinge
on the sensory receptors of the organism'. By whatever name
they are known, however, they are the projection of what was
experienced originally as a check, or impediment, S m  at any
rate a distinctive feature in the continuous activity-stream 
of psychical life.
It is in this way, then, as far as the process can be re- 
-constructed, that there is eventually formed the conception 
of a 'world' or 'reality' other than the self. These re- 
-current phases in the flow of the activity-stream which stand 
out from the remainder as distinctive are most simply dealt 
with by the conjecture that they originate in 'outer' objects 
or forces, commonly assumed to exist inftheir own right, in- 
-dependently of the experiencer. Ultimately these outer ob- 
-jects are regarded as forming a totality or universe, and it 
is to this that the name Reality strictly applies.
On this analysis, too, it is clear that the saaSâEtjLSB. of 
Reality ranks as a conjecture or hypothesis. It is forced 
on the experiencer as the best way of handling awkward facts, 
as the best way of interpreting and controlling his exper- 
-ienoe. But it is so consistently vindicated throughout 
the whole of life that it has become the very bedrock of all 
our beliefs and mental habits, even of our mental structure.
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Only in a philosopher do people regard with indulgence (no 
doubt tempered with amusement) the suggestion that the con- 
-oept of Reality is of hypothetical or conjectural origin.
To common sense nothing seems so certain as the Reality of an 
external world, independent of the thought of individuals.#
It is perhaps useful to indicate here the different in- 
-terpretations which philosophy has suggested with regard to 
this problem, and how these conform to tne analysis above. 
Material reality, it was shown, is, in the first instance, a 
distinctive phase of experience. If it is conceived also 
as existing independently of experience, does it follow that 
there are two material realities, one about which nothing can 
be known, and one mediated by experience, or phenomenal? Or 
are there two distinct streams, or flows, or worlds, one of 
ideas and one of things, which correspond iiÿîsome way, or 
resemble each other? Again, if we concentrate on experience 
as a single stream, which is what is given, and if material 
reality is admittedly &t least experience, should we not 
regard it as merely experience, with certain forms of Idealism ?
The salient facts in the whole question are the activity- 
-stream and its threefold character. As activity-stream it 
constitutes what is called the Ego. One phase of the stream
may be regarded as self-explanatory, another requires re- 
-ference to the body, another requires reference to a Reality. 
All are phases of the stream, however, as Solipsism points 
out. The third is a phase of the stream, as Subjective 
Idealism points out. It is possible to abstract the Reality 
reference, and treat it as an independent entity, the Realists 
insist. But this, it is replied, is merely a convenient 
abstraction for pragmatic purposes, and ignores the fact that 
the Reality reference is secondary to the being of Reality 
as a phase of the activity-stream. The discussions, it is 
evident, can be carried out to the greatest degree of minute 
and subtle epistemological analysis. But it is sufficient, 
for the purposes of the present theory of Ethics, to give the 
above outline merely, with the supplement contained in the 
rest of this chapter.
29
4 .
Reality as Physical and Social.
In this conception of Reality, as it is formed by a 
member of a civilized group, there can be distinguished two 
aspects, which it is proposed to call physical and social.
The conception of Reality is of course most familiar to us 
as the conception of something physical. It is the concept- 
-ion of a world which possesses certain definite character- 
-istics, which exhibits certain sequences and uniformities, 
which expresses fixed lawa of nature, impervious in their 
operation to all forms of mere psychical activity, such as 
hoping or imagining or wishing. When we speak of following 
the Reality-principle, too, we usually mean to adapt one's 
behaviour to this physical aspect of Reality. It is indeed 
just the one object of the earliest education of a child tç 
ensure that he will appreciate and recognise this physical 
character of Reality, for his safety and survival very clearly 
depend on knowledge of this kind. If a child remains ignor- 
-ant of these physical laws, and calmly plays, say, with 
matches and dynamite, or attempts to swallow an inedible toy, 
he is plainly courting immediate disaster.
But the conception of Reality may be said to have a social 
aspect also. This consists of the economic, moral, and
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cultural conditions prevailing in the community to which 
the individual belongs. It seems legitimate to regard these 
conditions as an aspect of Reality, because they are just as 
impervious to the wishes of the individual as are physical 
facts. To follow the Reality-principle will therefore 
signify to conform to social as well as to physical facts.
It is not difficult to show how such conformity to social 
Reality is as necessary for safety and survival as is the 
appreciation of physical Reality. If a person refuses, for 
instance, to accomodate himself to the facts of the economic 
system under which his group lives, accepting neither its 
conditions of employment nor its loopholes of charity, he is 
plainly courting starvation and death. There is what is 
often aptly designated a grim economic barrier, in modern 
civilized communities, which constitutes for most people a 
formidable aspect of Reality. Similarly, if a person refuses 
to live in at least outward conformity to the social con- 
-ventions and moral regulations of his group, he will be 
ostracised, or segregated, or even destroyed.
There is, in short, an aspect of Reality which is social 
in character, and to adapt one's behaviour to social Reality 
is as vital for the welfare and survival of the individual 
as is the recognition of physical laws. The education which 
is furnished by parents, teachers, religious institutions.
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and by all the myriad agencies comprised in one's social 
heritage, has for its main object to secure, on the part of 
every member of the community, that obedience to social laws 
without which the community could not itself exist. Reality, 
it is clear, has these two.distinguishable aspects, the 
physical and the social: the laws and properties of the 
material world, and the intangible, but equally adamant, con- 
-ditions of social or common life. T o adapt oneself to both 
is the very first prerequisite for survival.
3.
The Real and The Actual.
There is another, and perhaps more important,corollary,to 
the account given above of the way in which the conception of 
Reality is formed. It is a conception the content of which 
develops. To common sense, for instance. Reality is a world 
of concrete objects, such as trees, rivers, mountains, stars, 
and the like. To scientific analysis it is a system of 
atoms, elements, molecules, or constellations. In the most 
recent physics and philosophical speculation it has acquired 
a still stranger garb, as in Einstein or Alexander. It would 
seem., then, that these different contents of the conception 
of Reality are properly to be regarded as working hypotheses
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or approximations, rather than Reality itself. One way of 
representing this fact conveniently is to treat the content 
of Reality itself as an ideal, and, adapting the terminology 
of Hegel, to treat the different conceptions of the content 
of Reality which are conjectured at different stages of know- 
-ledge as belonging to what might be called Actuality. The 
Real and the Actual are thus distinct conceptions. The 
Actual stands for the content of a conception of the Real at 
some particular point in the psychical flow. It is the Real,
if we like, as mediated by experience. The flow of experience 
may be called, in Hegelian phraseology, 'existence' : but the 
mass of empirical elements which constitute existence or 
Actuality are not to be simply identified with Reality. The 
Actual is some formulated conception of the Real, rather than 
the Real itself. The Real, to repeat, is an ideal.
The use of the concept of Reality, it is now evident, does 
conceal a definite metaphysical doctrine. What the above 
corollary implies might be crudely represented in imagery of 
an elementary kind by comparing the Real to the summit of a 
mountain peak, towards which there is a gradual ascent, that 
is, experience. The path of the ascent stands for the Actual, 
that which gives a foothold whereby the psychical flow is at 
once controlled and guided. To follow the Reality-principle, 
on such an image, would signify to follow the path of the
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Actual, rather than the airy tracks of pure psychical wishing, 
imagining, hallucination. Strictly, therefore, we should 
speak of the Actuality-principle, not the Reality-principle.
But even the use of such an image fails to convey the full 
nature of the Real and its relation to the Actual. For it is 
the Real which animates the Actual. It is only in so far as 
the Actual is animated by the Real, and embodies something of 
it, that the Actual itself has significance. The Real is not 
a separate edition of the Actual. It is implicit in the 
Actual, it jj. the Actual, the 'this' and 'now' , suffused with 
complete understanding. The 'particular' is never merely a 
'particular', but is a partial expression of the universality 
from which it derives its significance.
It is no doubt a crucial task for any philosophical system 
which takes this standpoint to explain how a relation of this 
type is possible. Many explanations have been suggested, 
from the idealism of Socrates and Plato down to that of Hegel 
and his followers. But it is, in the last resort, a post- 
-ulate, a hypothesis, a faith, reached by forcing reflection 
to its very limits, and by attempting to envisage the process 
and experience ill their entirety# It seems, when we 
do this, as though life itself consisted in just this effort 
to reach the Real. It is a contest in which the goal is 
the full and adequate grasping of Reality. Life ig. the
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effort at progressive attainment or comprehension of the Real. 
Why or how this should be remains insoluble for speculative 
thought. To probe further into the problems of what it is 
that is comprehending the Real, or why there should be this 
cooperative relationship between the activity of mind and 
Reality, is to tread in a morass of metaphysics in which there 
is very little sure foothold.
It must be emphasised, however, that to ignore the dis- 
-tinction just drawn between the Real and the Actual leads to 
inevitable confusion. The disputes between Pragmatism and 
Idealism illustrate this. Schiller, for instance, argues 
that all recognition of fact is provisional, relative to our 
purposes and inquiries. "Our knowing", he writes, "is driven 
and guided at every step by our subjective interests and 
preferences, our desires, our needs and our ends." From this 
statement, which is strictly applicable only to the psychol- 
-ogical impulse behind the processes of knowing, Schiller goes 
on to a statement about the content of knowledge, about 
Reality. He holds that "the direction of our effort, itself 
determined by our desires and will to know, enters as a 
necessary and ineradicable factor into whatever revelation of 
Reality we can attain." In other words, "to some extent the 
world is of our making." (Humanism, pp.9,10-11, 12)
But does it follow from the fact of a change in our con-
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-eeptions of Reality that Reality is itself changing? It 
may be admitted that our conceptions of Reality are connected 
with one another, that one working hypothesis suggests another, 
less inadequate, that a later conception at once includes and 
corrects conceptions which have preceded it. It is this fact 
indeed which gives plausibility to the statement that "our 
effort is a necessary factor in the revelation of Reality".
But this does not imply in the least that Reality changes as 
our experience changes. The content of our conceptions of 
Reality no doubt varies as our experience varies, but a part- 
-icular content cannot be simply identified with Reality 
itself. To assume that there are real laws or properties 
of molecules, that there is a Reality or Necessity which in 
cooperation with human functioning appears as experience, is, 
it has been shown, the basis of all reflective interpretation 
of life. It is just as essential to assume that different 
conceptions of Reality are judged to be different because they 
approximate more or less to that Reality which is the ultimate 
explanation of the whole of experience.
It is easy to ridicule the conception of Reality in this 
sense, and to identify it with the immutable Being of the 
Eleatios or the abiding Ousia of Plato. But the conception 
of Reality is not necessarily the conception of something 
transcendental. It is a conception framed to interpret
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experience, and it is just the name for tne most complece 
conjectural interpretation of experience which can be given. 
Once it is granted that something other than psychical act- 
-ivity is necessarily presupposed in experience, it follows 
that a distinction can be legitimately drawn between the 
Actual and the Real. The one step supplements the other, 
and carries the possibility of interpreting experience a stage 
further.
Such, then, is a provisional justification for the use of 
the concept Reality, and an explicit statement of the meta- 
-physical assumptions involved in the expression "to follow 
the Reality-principle". The conception of Reality, it may 
be repeated, has been regarded as a conjecture, or hypothesis, 
but a hypothesis which acquires in the course of experience 
the greatest certainty possible in human knowledge. It was 
suggested that Reality can be distinguished as physical and 
social, and it was shown that the content of the conception 
varies or develops. To follow the Reality-principle, which 
is the condition of survival, thus signifies to adapt oneself 
to actual life, or to the laws of physical and social Reality, 
as these laws have been formulated, or understood, at any 
stage in human evolution.
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Chapter III.
REASON AND MORALS.
1.
The Nature of Reason.
Since to conform to Reality is, as we have seen, the one 
fundamental condition of survival, it is natural that the 
capacity in man by virtue of which this conformity is poss- 
-ible should rank as supremely important. The name given 
to the capacity varies. Descartes called it 'good sense', 
something which he held to be "naturally equal in all men", 
and to be in fact the mark of distinction between animals and 
human beings. (Discourse on Method, Part One). In present- 
-day mental tests it is known as 'intelligence', and can even, 
by a series of ingenious devices and mathematical correlations, 
be represented quantitatively. The name for it, however, 
which is rooted most firmly in common speech is Reason. To 
follow the Reality-principle is equivalent, we may say, to 
what is conveyed by the expression "to be reasonable". In 
other words, reason, in its most general usage, stands for 
that capacity of an individual in virtue of which he can adapt 
his behaviour to meet the conditions of the world in which he 
lives.
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That reason has this supreme importance for the practical 
business of living seems to be abundantly testified by the 
ordinary use of the word. Those, for instance, whose capacity 
of reason has been impaired, or who have lost their reason 
altogether, are just those persons who are no longer able to 
adjust themselves to the complex conditions of their life and 
surroundings. That is why the community does not allow them 
to mix freely with their fellows. Similarly, to call a 
person 'unreasonable' indicates a belief that the person so 
called is acting in a selfish, self-centred, obstinate fash- 
-ion, incompatible either with the real facts of his situat- 
-ion, or with the claims of other people. To 'reason' with 
such a person is to try and make him perceive those facts or 
claims. It is significant that it is invariably taken for 
granted that the perception, in the case of reasonable beings, 
will necessarily be followed by behaviour more adapted to 
Reality. Reason, then, would seem to be the most appropriate 
name for this capacity of an organism to adapt its behaviour 
to Reality, or, in the original phraseology, to follow the 
Reality-principle.
This is no doubt more readily apparent with regard to 
physical Reality. If a person believes, for instance, that 
twice two are five, or that playing with burning matches is 
a healthy pastime, he is evidently 'unreasonable'. Reality
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is so constituted tnat twice two are not five, and that
burning matches are dangerous. But it is equally true of
social Reality. If a person firmly believes, in spite of a
situation plainly incompatible with the belief, that he is
the Emperor of China, he is again 'unreasonable'. The social
conditions under which he lives are such that he is not the
Emperor of China. In both cases, physical and social, to
be unreasonable conveys the same meaning, and the use of the
expression rests on the same grounds. The criterion of what
is reasonable lies, ultimately, in Reality, under one aspect 
or the other.
Reason, on this view, is evidently a capacity of the in- 
-dividual which grows or develops, not a faculty complete 
from the beginning, with categories which are incapable of 
analysis. It is a capacity which has been evolved in the 
organism because of its supreme survival-value. The Prag-
-matic standpoint, it is only fair to note, has in this conn- 
-ection supplied a useful corrective to any purely abstract 
conception of reason. Schiller writes, for instance, "I 
cannot but conceive the reason as being, like the rest of our 
equipment, a weapon in the struggle for existence and a means 
of achieving adaptation. " (Humanism, p.7) So Dewey, "The 
genuine heart of reasonableness lies in effective mastery of 
the conditions which u q w enter into action." (Human Nature
40
and Conduct, p.6?) The nature of reason, in other words, 
is capable of analysis. Its categories are to be explained 
in terms of past experience. They mast reflect that Reality 
or Necessity, that Nature of Things, from the need of under- 
-standing which reason has been evolved.
This does not imply, of course, that there is nothing 
fixed in the character of reason. Just as the organism 
possesses sense-organs and pre-rational tendencies, instinct- 
-ive dispositions which have been Imposed on its structure 
in the course of evolution, and now seem rigid, unalterable, 
ineradicable, so reason may itself be regarded as exhibiting 
certain definite characteristics, or categories, which have 
likewise become rigid, crystallised, as the result of their 
age-long transmission. It is the business of Logic to make 
explicit these categories of reason, but some of the Post- 
-Kantian logicians have gone further, and endowed them with 
creative power, taking the effect for the cause. What is 
being emphasised here, therefore, is that these categories 
reflect that Reality or Necessity for the appreciation and 
understanding of which reason has been evolved. It may be 
said that the categories are objective and universal. They 
are, admittedly, but it should be remembered that these 
characteristics apply, strictly and in the last resort, to 
Reality. It is only in so far as Reality has imposed its
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nature on the structure of the organism, on the mental equip- 
-ment of the species, that these qualities (universality, 
objectivity, and the like) can be attributed to reason. The 
'Laws of Thought', for instance, are universal, objective, 
prior to experience: but the ultimate explanation of their 
character is just that some permanence must be assumed in 
the world, in Reality, if predication is to be possible. It 
was in a philosophical setting of Heraclitean and Sophistic 
views about Reality that Plato and Aristotle were led to 
formulate these Laws of Thought. It is the nature of 
Reality, in short, which has determined the ways by which 
thinking must proceed.
The categories, then, are residual traces of the effort 
of the organism to grasp and conform to Reality. They are, 
as it were, clues, successful hypotheses, which reason has 
now made its own. The detailed analysis of reason, the 
statement of the technical elements out of which its fabric 
is woven, need not be more exactly indicated here. A strik- 
-ing analysis has, for example, been presented by Rignano, 
in his recently-translated 'Psychology of Reasoning'. But, 
in the most general terms, reason seems to be bound up with 
the characteristics of life itself, and to consist essentially 
in a process of synthesis or integration.
@  ■ —    —
A fuller account of this whole theme is contained in section 
62 of my^essay on "The Unconscious",(London, I923).
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We may shortly define reason, then, for our present needs, 
as just the capacity of the organism to maintain itself, at 
a certain stage of development, in its relations with the 
real world; the capacity to appreciate the properties of the 
physical world and the conditions of social life; and the 
capacity of adapting its behaviour to those properties and 
those conditions. The fact that reason is regarded as the 
supreme capacity of human beings, as that which differentiates 
them, in fact, from other creatures, reflects the unique 
survival-value which the evolution of the capacity entails.
The categories, it has further been argued, are genetically 
related to Reality. But their appropriation has been now 
so thoroughly rooted in the structure of the organism, in 
reason, that there is a virtual identity between the Real 
and the Rational, as the famous dictum of Hegel suggests.
2.
Reason and Morals.
The argument which is contained in the different sections 
of the above discussion may now be stated in summary form, as 
f ollows ;-
(a) Reality, to which the individual must adapt his be- 
-haviour, on peril of destruction, signifies not only the
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physical world, hut, in the case of members of an organised 
community, signifies a system of certain social conditions 
as well. These social conditions, regarded generally,
(the relation between them, for instance, between economic 
and moral conditions, is considered below), constitute the 
data of morals. They are, even at first glance, conditions 
which are essential to the’possibility of common or group life. 
They furnish, it might be said, a more complicated expression 
of Reality. At a certain stage in human evolution, the 
stage at which social life has emerged. Reality displays this 
new aspect. It now comprises the customs, the laws, the 
conventions, in short, the morality, of the group in which 
the individual lives.
(b) In virtue of a capacity which is known as reason, and 
which Is the most important capacity the organism possesses, 
the individual is enabled to adapt his behaviour to Reality, 
in both its physical and social aspects. In the former case, 
successful adaptation ranks as practical or scientific 
knowledge, perhaps as common sense. In the latter case, it 
ranks as goodness, virtue, morality.
(c) Thus to be moral, that is, to have insight into the 
conditions of social life, and to be reasonable, are ex- 
-pressions of the same fundamental capacity in human beings.
To obey the regulations of one's group, to respect the claims
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of one's fellows, in short, to he honest and unselfish and 
decent, does not spring from a 'moral sense' which is diff- 
-erent from anything else in the human constitution, but re- 
-flects, in the last analysis, the measure of one's capacity 
of reason, of adapting one's behaviour to the facts of social 
Reality, of controlling impulses and following the Reality- 
-principle.
It should be added, even at this stage, that the dis- 
-tinetion drawn above between the Real and the Actual has an 
important implication with regard to social Reality. It 
implies that the existing moral customs or practices of a 
coiimunity, the empirical content of social Reality at any 
time and place, are to be regarded as a formulation of the 
Real, or an approxima^ tion to the Real. They constitute the 
moral currency which has been created by the reason of some 
particular community to make social life, or at least its 
conception of social life, possible. It is not in the least 
legitimate, therefore, to regard them as merely so much 
antiquated lumber, no longer of use, which can be swept aside 
by the ardent social reformer as irrelevant for his purposes, 
or even as impediments in his path. They are more properly 
to be regarded as the most valuable tools which the reformer 
can find, the very instruments, in fact, by which he may 
attain his improved or more reasonable conception of social 
Reality.
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Existing systems of morality may vary, just as existing 
systems of physics vary. But there is a substantial basis 
of proved and accepted doctrine in both. Neither a new 
theory in physics, nor a new experiment in moral and social 
practice, can be suddenly put forward, with any hope of winn- 
-ing acceptance, if it bears no relation to the existing 
structures of physics and morality, as these have commended 
themselves to the reason of men. It would seem, then, that 
the Actual, in morals, should stand for the attempt to embody 
social Reality, and that the Real, in morals as in knowledge, 
represents an ideal, at once the goal and the inspiration of 
the process.
Such, then, is the argument to which these early chapters 
point. The thesis which has been stated offers a prelimin- 
-ary clue to the significance of morals. Some of the trad- 
-itional conceptions of Ethics will now be examined in the 
light of this thesis, and the fuller implications of the 
thesis will be shown by contrasting it with certain histor- 
-ical views to which it bears, at first sight, a resemblance.
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Chapter IV.
MORALITY AND LAW.
1.
The Identity of Morality and Law.
It would seem to follow, from the theory which has now 
been outlined, that the regulations of morality are simply 
the conditions essential to social life. If this is so, 
there appears to be no difference between morality and law. 
For law is just that body of conditions which a community 
regards as essential to its maintenance. Yet it seems as 
though we ^  recognise some difference between law and ' 
morality. Sometimes morality^  appears to be very much wider 
than law. As the Roman jurist Paul puts it, 'non omne quod 
licet hone8turn est'. It is occasionally possible to be 
dishonest without stepping outside legal requirements. We 
often impute, for example, to certain sharp practices of 
business or finance, which may be not actually illegal, a 
taint of doubtful morality. On the other hand, law some- 
-times appears to be wider than morality. It deals, for in- 
— stance, with such things as the control of traffic and the 
collection of income-tax, the 'moral' significance of which 
is perhaps not immediately evident. Law and morality.
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therefore, seem certainly distinct. When the Greek poet 
makes his Antigone appeal, in a famous phrase, from the law 
of her country to those Oeojv
(Sophocles, Antigone ,4^ 4-^ ) 
the "unwritten hut immutable laws of God", the contrast 
comes out in vivid colouring. How, then, can a theory of 
morals be valid, if it implies that law and morality are 
virtually the same thing?
It may be replied, in the first place, that it is ex- 
-ceedingly difficult to state the exact criterion by which 
law i^ to be differentiated from morality. It has been 
suggested,(for instance, by Kant, in his 'Science of Right'), 
that law is concerned only with the external actions of an 
individual, or rather, with his actions considered merely as 
outward events, whereas morality is concerned with the 
actions as inner determinations of the will, as expressing 
motives. Law can compel a person to pay his debts, that is, 
it can regulate the outward action. But it cannot, on such 
a view, ensure that the payment results from a moral motive, 
from the recognition that some moral principle is involved.
As Caird comments, "It is obvious that Jurisprudence, in the 
strict sense of the word, reaches so far as, and no farther 
than, the possibility of compulsion." ( Philosophy of Kant, 
II.P.29B) In Kant's own words, "legal right.. must base
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itself firmly on the principle of the possibility of an ex- 
-ternal compulsion*•• Right and claim to apply compulsion 
are therefore the same thing." (ibid.pp.298-29?)
But this suggested criterion does not stand the test of 
deeper analysis. Law does concern itself with more than the
external action. It enquires, for example, into intentions.,
which indeed, especially in criminal law, are just what give 
to an action its specific legal character. To restrict law 
to the external action would be to make it simply a branch 
of physical science. Besides, law itself may be said to 
supply a motive, or inner determination, for behaviour, inas— 
-much as the knowledge that violation of the law involves 
penalty or suffering may conceivably act as a determining 
influence on a person's conduct. Further, to treat the 
outward expression of behaviour as an isolated or abstract 
element, unrelated to its context of motive, impulse, 
purpose, intention, and all the organic structure of human 
character and dispositions which give it meaning and life, 
can at most be a convenient, practical mode of classific- 
-ation. It cannot withstand critical analysis.
Granted, however, that there is no exact line of diff- 
-erentiation possible between law and morality, does it 
follow that they are identical? If they are indeed ident- 
-ical, why do they appear so certainly to be different?
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They are identical, it seems, with respect to the function 
in human affairs which they fulfil. In the last analysis, 
law and morality do express the same fundamental need in 
human life. nothing in law, it is clear, can be said really 
to lack moral significance. Traffic control, the rule of 
the road, the law of inheritance or conveyance of property, 
even the collection of income-tax, are all directed to sub- 
-serve the maintenance and the welfare of the community, 
which is a moral end. Law and morality appear to be diff- 
-erent because they give effect to this common moral end in 
different degrees. The conditions under which law is 
realised, its generality, its impersonal character, its 
inevitable use of rigid language and the consequent difficulty 
of interpretation, all combine to accentuate the apparent 
contrast between law and morality. Law seems static, alien, 
stagnant, while moral principles seem to be as fluid and as 
mobile as the living substance in which they develop.
The ultimate source of law, however, is just this very 
growth of moral principles, this effort of reason to form- 
-ulate the conditions of social Reality. Law has its roots 
in the living soil of moral development. It seems to lag 
behind morality because it embodies the conception of social 
Reality which belongs to a particular stage of human pro- 
-gress. It is like a photograph, which records the living
0^personality in what was simply a momentary phase of its 
continuous growth. But it is in reason, in the moral con- 
-sciousness, that the ultimate source of law is to be found.
Law and morality, so far from being in any sense divorced, 
coincide both in origin and in function. The apparent 
difference between them merely signifies that law is a 
specially conditioned form of morality. As general and as 
static it can reflect only partially what is in essence a 
living, dynamic growth.
2 .
Morals and Jurisprudence.
The view just suggested is in harmony with the standpoint
of the Roman jurists. For their definitions of law clearly
indicate a conception of the underlying identity between law
and morality. At the beginning of Justinian's Institutes,
for example, we read that 'Justitia est constans et perpétua
voluntas, jus suum cuique tribuens', that is, "Justice is the
spirit which always, without intermission, assigns to each
person his due". Such a definition, it has often been noted,
belongs almost wholly to moral philosophy. 'Voluntas' is
reminiscent of Aristotle's e U s  r / k a n d  the words
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'jus suum cuique tribuens' take us back to the opening pages
of Plato's Republic, where a similar definition of justice 
is attributed to the poet Simonides. Again, the other de- 
-finition of law, 'Jus est ars boni et aequi', that is, 
"Justice is the craft of what is good and equitable", which 
Celsus formulates, and Ulpian so warmly commends, makes law 
quite evidently an embodiment of morality. Indeed the source 
of the great, massive strength of Roman Jurisprudence lies 
very largely in its close blending of law and morality.
But the most significant fact of all, in this connection, 
is the place of Equity in the development of law. In Roman 
law, the 'Jus Civile' or positiv| body of laws applicable to 
Roman citizens came gradually to be modified in practice by 
the 'Jus Gentium' or 'Jus Baturale', that is, a 'Law of 
Hature' which was supposed to be prescribed for all mankind 
by the light of natural reason. It was under the influence 
of Greek philosophyj no doubt, (if Stoicism, with its strong 
Eastern or Semitic element, can strictly be called Greek), 
that the Jurists were led to find this basis of equity in 
reason. But the development of Roman .law, and of this 'Jus 
Haturale' or Equity in particular, shows quite clearly that 
the ultimate source of law and morality was held to be the 
same. That this analysis is sound seems also to be con- 
-firmed by the history of modem Jurisprudence. The moral 
basis of law was consistently identified with this very 'Jus
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Haturale* or 'Law of Hature'. This is the standpoint of 
Aquinas, for instance, of the Schoolmen and Canonists, 
notably of Hooker, (where the Law of Nature is regarded as 
the Law of God), of Grotius, founder of International Law, 
of Locke, where, as Ritchie remarks, the idea of a Law of 
Nature forms almost the whole background of his thought.
Vico had designated it the "conscience of mankind", from 
which, he holds, law emanates, and in and through which alone
society can exist.
Again, in the metaphysical analysis of law, or the 
'Rechtsphilosophie', as it is called, of the Continental 
jurists, it has been emphasised time and again that law, like 
morality, is founded on reason. Vfhat these writers call 
'Naturrecht', or Law of Nature, is a vague formula for what 
has been called above 'Social Reality', comprising those 
ideal social conditions which constitute at once the source 
of evolving positive law and the criterion by which that law 
is tested. Law derives, in other words, from the moral life, 
from the rational conception of social Reality. Thus Krause 
defines 'Recht* as "the organic whole of the outward condition 
necessary to the rational life", and Henrici holds, "Right 
is that which is really necessary to the maintenance of the 
material conditions essential to the existence and perfection 
of human personality". (Quoted in Green, Principles of 
Political Obligation, section 11, footnote).
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There seems, then, to be abundant evidence for the view 
that law is rooted in morality. The end and the criterion 
of law, it is clear, are essentially moral conceptions. In 
the work of Green just quoted, law is regarded as "the con- 
-dition of a positive realisation of the moral capacity".
Or if we expand, as in Pollock, the old definition of law 
given by Celsus (Jus est ars boni et aequi), lav/ can be aptly 
described as "so.much of the permanent principles of moral 
justice as is reduced or reducible to a technical system" 
(Pollock, Oxford Lectures, p.22). In the more vivid phrasing 
of Hegel, law is "the scaffolding, or rather the rudimentary 
framework, of society and moral life." It is the first 
stage, in his system, of what he calls Objective Spirit, that 
is, "the harmonious life of the social organism." Just as 
law can realise this ideal only partially, for the reasons 
indicated above, so, in Hegel's view, there is a corresponding 
inadequacy in the merely subjective aspect of morality, or 
private conscience. But in Social Ethics, or 'Sittlichkeit', 
that is, in what was designated above the ideal of Social 
Reality, or, in other words, the moral or rational life of 
the community, there is for Hegel a reconciliation of law and 
morality, of inner and outer, and they reveal their under- 
-lying unity and identity.
From these different sources, therefore, there is ample
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justification for the view that law and morality fulfil the 
same function in the development of organised human society. 
The apparent difference between them reflects the difference 
in the conditions under which they function. Law is 
necessarily general, impersonal, rigid, whereas moral prin- 
-ciples are living, progressive, dynamic. But the ultimate 
inspiration of both is the same, namely, that spark of 
collective reason in human beings which represents for us 
the main clue that we possess to the nature of life itself.
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Chapter V,
FREEDOM.
1.
The Springs of Action.
In the argument which was developed above with regard to 
the replacement of the Pleasure-principle by the Reality- 
-principle, it was tacitly assumed that the individual has 
the power of postponing or denying the gratification of his 
impulses. In the traditional language of Ethics (at least, 
modern Ethics) free-will or freedom has been taken for 
granted.
But the conception of freedom raises certain problems of 
its own. To maintain, on the one hand, that man possesses 
the power of doing whatever he pleases, in defiance of natural 
law, or of the effects of habit, or of the limitations imposed 
on him in virtue of his innate endowment or environment, seems 
an exaggeration which only the completely unreflective judg- 
-ment will dare to countenance. On the other hand, to follow 
the solution that seems to have commended itself to many 
writers, since the time of Spinoza, and to displace the 
emphasis in the concept from a power of acting or refraining
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from acting to the particular content of action or kind of 
action performed, to hold, in other words, that man is not 
free, but is becoming free, seems to be no more than tacitly 
abandoning the substance for what is in this case a part- 
-icularly unsatisfying shadow. Popular belief, law, 
theology, all cling to, and attempt to vindicate, a conception 
of freedom, which, if ciude, is at least real and satisfying* 
Nothing probably has contributed more to the discredit and 
suspicion with which Psycho-analysis, for instance, is 
commonly viewed than its alleged inconsistency with freedom. 
What, then, is the bearing of the theory of morals suggested 
above on the problem of freedom?
The; simplest approach to the question lies in an analysis 
of the ultimate springs of action. The primary necessity 
which is imposed on the human organism by the conditions of 
Reality can be described very generally as the control of 
stimulation. (In the more technical language of thermo- 
-dynamics every system is said to tend to equilibrium).
Now the human organism, in its effort to win success in the 
control of stimulation, evolved in the course of time a 
nervous system, and through this nervous system there funct- 
-ions something we call mind, or a mental apparatus* In 
psychological terms, stimuli which necessitate the inter- 
-vention of mind are known as wants, or appetites, or desires,
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or, again very generally, as impulses. Impulses, then, 
signify present tensions of the organism, and the business 
of the organism is bo try and relieve those tensions and so 
attain relative equilibrium. This is known as satisfying 
impulses. An impulse which is in process of being satisfied, 
or which has not yet been wholly satisfied, is what is known 
as a 'feeling'.
Certain ways of solving tensions hit the mark so com- 
-pletely that they become mnemically engraved in the structure 
of the organism. These are called habits, as, for instance, 
eating or drinking, and represent means of relieving tension, 
modes of response, which the organism has originally devised 
ana now retains as permanent features of its being. The 
power or capacity in virtue of which the organism originally 
forms habits constitutes an essential character of life, or, 
as it has been called above, reason. These habits, it may
be noted, are always operative, even when not specially em- 
-phasised. Habits of walking, for instance, are what de- 
-termine judgments of distance, and habits of drinking affect 
a person's response to curative factors during, say, an 
attack of influenza. The organism, above all, is a unity, 
and Its growth consists in the power of greater and greater 
integration, more and more complete adaptation in the face 
of an environmental situation becoming constantly more
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complex. The function of habits is to subserve this 
capacity for integration.
Such is the basis of the account of action given above, 
in less exact terms, as the replacement of the Pleasure- 
-principle by the Reality-principle. The instinctive im- 
-pulses constitute the tensions which prompt the organism 
to action. The solution of tension is marked by a state of 
relative equilibrium, or by a 'pleasurable' tone: the crude 
sway of the Pleasure-principle yields to a more complicated, 
but more efficient phase of the principle, known as the 
Reality-principle: and the capacity in man by which con-
-formity to the Reality-principle is attained is simply the 
capacity of Reason. This is the psychological background on 
which the question of free-will or freedom has to be met.
It is evident, then, that freedom must be closely related 
to reason. Free-will has in fact been assumed in the 
ascription to human beings of a capacity of reason. Since, 
too, reason has been regarded as the characteristic mark of 
the life-impulse itself, freedom and life are evidently akin 
also, perhaps synonymous. Is this apparent identity of 
freedom, reason, life, really tenable?
2.
Freedom and Reason.
Much of the difficulty in the conception of free-will has
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arisen from the misleading psychological abstraction of a 
'will', and the exclusive emphasis on freeaom of the will.
This abstraction of a specific function of willing from the . 
unified activity of the organism is responsible for the in- 
-numerable artificial problems of motived or motiveless 
choice, determination of the will by antecedents, and the 
like. A methodological postulate of Determinism in mental 
life is assumed to contradict the freedom of an abstract 
'will'. But in reality will is not a faculty which can be 
thus isolated. What will stands for is just the most 
fundamental capacity of the organism, the core or essence of 
a self or character. Will, in short, is simply a phase of 
reason. It emphasises the moment of activity, whereas 
reason suggests the abstract description of the capacity, or 
the capacity as potential. Both will and reason are just 
distinguishable aspects of the one fact. A particular 
volitional act is no more than a constriction, a localising, 
a concentrating of the general integrative capacity of the 
organism known as reason. To will something is to focus at 
a particular point, where a specific tension has been located, 
the requisite resources or mnemically engraved potentialities, 
of the organism.
That will is thus essentially bound up with reason can 
be readily shown also if will is contrasted with wish. To
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wish is to follow a psychical process, which recks nothing, 
or practically nothing, of Reality, but, as in day-dreaming, 
flits inconsequentially from one image to another. To will, 
on the other hand, is to take cognisance of Reality, and to 
conceive or execute behaviour which fits into a world of real 
facts and other people. It is the criterion of reason, or 
the Reality-principle, which marks the distinction between 
them. Will, in short, is just reason regarded as at some 
specific moment of action.
To speak of free-will may be permissible, then, if it is 
remembered that the 'free' part of the conception expresses 
that general characteristic of the organism known as its 
capacity of reason, and the 'will' part of the conception is 
an abstraction, a dramatic or figurative isolation of the 
organism in the moment of functioning. It is in the oap- 
-acity of reason to adapt behaviour to the facts of Reality 
that the nature of freedom is alone revealed. Man is free 
because and if he is reasonable, and the measure of his 
rational Insight into the conditions of the world in which 
he lives is the measure of his freedom.
It is perhaps relevant to notice here how this view of 
the identity between reason and freedom is confirmed from 
Law. Law ma.kes use of the concept of 'responsibility', as 
the equivalent of moral freedom, and the criterion of
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responsibility is invariably the possession of reason. Only 
those persons are deemed to be legally responsible for their 
actions who are fully reasonable, that is, are not minors, 
lunatics, etc. There are, too, degrees of responsibility 
in law, as in the infliction of wrongs on another person : 
and in this connection it is again reason which provides the 
test. "The rule is", we read in Srskine, "that every one 
must be held liable for the natural and probable consequences 
of his act or default, and that there the liability stops.
The only criterion that can be suggested is that the result 
must be such as might have been foreseen by a reasonable man" 
(Erskine, Principles of the Law of Scotland, 20th edition, p. 
102).
Law requires in fact the exercise of reasonable care in 
all the ordinary activities of life, and the plea of thought- 
-lessness is by itself deemed insufficient to secure exemption 
from legal penalties. As the maxim has it, 'ignorantia juris 
neminem excusât'. In short, law takes its stand upon the 
view that the members of a community who are fit to partic- 
-ipate in social life are reasonable beings and therefore 
responsible or free: that in virtue of their reason or freedom 
they can adapt their conduct to the facts or claims of 
Reality: and that the measure of their adaptation must corr- 
-espond in every predictable event with what is implied in
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"the exercise of reasonable care"* The whole doctrine of 
legal responsibility evidently supports the view of reason 
and freedom suggested above. Similarly, the justification 
of punishment can only come from the assumption of reason in 
the wrong—doer. The recollection of the punishment, it is 
intended, will serve to ensure a greater measure of adaptation 
to. the Reality-principle, or control of purely selfish im- 
—pulses: in short, the exercise of a greater degree of reason. 
Thus McDougall points out in one place, "While v/e rightly 
punish children and animals, we do not punish madmen" (Social 
Psychology, p.252).
5.
Unreasonable Action and Freedom.
■It may be questioned, however, whether this view, valid 
as it apparently is in the sphere of law, holds good in 
Ethics also. If freedom is just the capacity of acting 
reasonably, why, it will be asked, does the capacity so often 
yield to some overmastering impulse, and how is the fact of 
such 'unreasonable' behaviour compatible with the possession
of reason and freedom?
It may be replied, in the first place, that Reality has 
been distinguished as physical and social. Now in the case
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of physical Reality, while it is the mark of reason to grasp 
and conform to physical facts or laws, it is sometimes found 
that in certain people psychical elements are so strong that 
the people in question i&nore the testimony of physical 
Reality in some respect or other. They are a prey to super- 
-stitions or prejudices, they are perhaps the victims of some 
strange hallucination. Thus some primitive religions induce 
a belief in the causal relation between propitiation of a 
goddess and an excellent harvest, while many quite reasonable 
persons attributed the sudden death of Lord Carnarvon in 1925 
to a malign spirit of the dead Egyptian monarch whose tomb he 
had violated.
May not a similar psychological analysis apply to social. 
Reality also? To conform to that aspect of Reality con- 
-stituted by moral regulations is, as we have seen, likewise 
the mark of reason. But in this sphere too certain in- 
-stinctive impulses are so strong in some people that they 
fail to grasp, or ignore, the testimony of social Reality. 
They plunge headlong into a career of unscinipulous wealth- 
-begetting, or they become petty offenders, or even, in the 
course of time, hardened criminals. The psychological pro- 
-cesses, however, seem to be the same in the case of both 
aspects of Reality. The one class of persons is imperfectly 
reasonable in respect to physical Reality, the other class is
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imperfectly reasonable with regard to social Reality.
It is true, of course, that there is a difference in the 
0pnsequenpes of intellectual and of moral unreasonableness#
A minimum of rational behaviour in respect to the physical 
world is such an immediate practical necessity that the 
standard in this sphere is apparently higher than in the 
other. It is easier, for instance, to grasp the danger to 
life from exposure to an earthquake than to perceive the 
social collapse which would accompany the violation of moral 
principles to any large extent. But in both spheres it is 
the exercise of reason which is the one condition of in- 
-dividual and social maintenance. What is being stressed, 
in short, is simply that, at the stage of complexity in the 
evolution of life which is marked by the emergence of social 
order, there can be discerned the functioning of a capacity 
known as reason, and that in virtue of the possession of this 
capacity man seeks to adapt his behaviour to the facts of 
Reality, both physical and social; more especially, it is in 
virtue of this capacity that man is able to control his im- 
-pulses, to postpone their immediate satisfaction, and even 
to forego the attainment of certain impulse-satisfactions 
altogether, in order to secure, consciously or unconsciously, 
the survival and stability of his group.
It may be pointed out, also, that reason operates only
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within certain limitations, set hy the constitution of the 
organism itself. The analogy of the rules of a game may 
again be adduced. Just as there are definite rules govern- 
-ing a game, to which every player must strictly adhere, but 
within the requirements of which there is scope for the 
greatest differences of skill, proficiency, talent; so, it 
would seem, there are definite facts concerning human nature, 
its physical powers, its instinctive dispositions, the plast- 
-icity of the nervous system, from which facts there is no 
escape nor appeal, but within which may be exhibited the 
greatest differences in reasonable behaviour. It is the 
distinction, in a slightly modified form, between Ethics and 
Psychology. The facts about human nature are material for 
psychological analysis. The task of such analysis is to 
reveal the springs of conduct, the mechanisms of character- 
-formation, the tortuous paths along which impulses proceed, 
how they are deflected from their original goal and perhaps 
sublimated, and so, in a word, to disclose the antecedents of 
a present particular tendency to action. But all this psy- 
-chological analysis, it is evident, only applies to the rules 
or limits under which reason functions. It leaves intact, 
undisputed, unaffected, the bare capacity of reason, and in 
consequence freedom, with which Ethics is primarily con— 
-cerned.
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No amount of psychological analysis, in fact, can justify 
the hypothesis of Determinism in morals, any more than such 
analysis can afford a complete explanation of moral be- 
-haviour. The standpoint of the two sciences is altogether
distinct. Determinism stands for a postulate of method, a
necessary assumption for the scientific treatment of that 
construction of experience with which psychology deals# If 
an element in that construction is to be 'explained', it must 
be regarded as the result of antecedents, as related causally 
to other elements in the system. Otherwise no scientific 
treatment of mental activity is possible. But the stand- 
-point of Ethics is quite distinct. The possibility of 
ethical or moral judgment rests simply on man's capacity of 
reason, and whatever the ultimate object of the moral judg- 
-ment may be, (a particular action, or a habit, or character 
as a whole), it is not explained by being given its place in 
the psychological construction of experience. The moral 
standpoint is. What amount of rational insight into the con- 
-ditions of social life does this action reveal? In so far 
as the action is reasonable, judged by the first principles 
of social Reality, it is free. Determinism, which is a 
postulate of method, has no meaning in Ethics. All action, 
if it is to be treated psychologically, must be regarded as 
having been determined. But all action, if it is to be
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made the subject of moral appraisal, must be regarded as the 
expression of reasonableness, greater or less: and the measure 
of reasonableness is the measure of moral freedom.
There is nothing incompatible with freedom, then, in the 
fact that some behaviour is unreasonable. N o one would deny 
that there is skill involved in the game of chess, for ex- 
-ample, on the ground that some people who have practised the 
game for many years are poor players. If we would appreciate 
the possibilities of a game, we study its finest exponents. 
Similarly, if we woaid understand the nature of reason or 
freedom, we must go to the lives of great statesmen or wise 
rulers, to men of outstanding character or achievements: for 
tnese embody the highest reach of human capacity known.
There are vast differences in moral reasonableness, that 
is, in moral development or stature, just as there are vast 
differences in mental or intellectual stature. It is even 
possible, indded, that such differences can themselves be 
correlated, and that there is actually an exact correspond- 
-ence between the stages of reason in the two spheres. Thus 
petty offenders are usually defective in reason or intell— 
-igence: and some experimental work has been carried out 
(reference to which is made, for instance, in McDougall's 
National Welfare and National Decay") which even suggests 
an exact correspondence between certain mental traits and
68
certain moral qualities.
It may still be objected, however, at this point, that 
many rogues are exceptionally intelligent persons, and that 
many very clever people are highly immoral. Is it not quite 
arbitrary, it may be asked, to use the same term, reasonable- 
-ness, in reference to both moral and mental spheres? Is it 
not still more arbitrary to imagine that there is any exact 
equation between them?
The reply to this objection is that we commonly use diff- 
-erent criteria in estimating moral and intellectual attain- 
-ments, and that the criterion by which we judge a rogue to 
be clever is not the criterion by which moral reasonableness 
is to be judged. An unscrupulous but successful financier 
of a modern community is deemed clever, or intellectually 
reasonable, because of his success. But the test of moral 
reasonableness is not success in amassing wealth. It is 
rather the measure of a man's insight into social Reality, 
that is, the wellbeing of the community as a whole. It may 
be that, on this view, the unscrupulous financier is markedly 
unreasonable, and that he owes his success (an ephemeral, 
accidental success, dependent on some particular standard of 
the age, in this ease an economic one) just to that blind 
insistence on the gratification at all costs of selfish im- 
-pulses, which overrides consideration for the claims of
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other people, and which constitutes the very essence of im- 
-perfeot grasp of social Reality. Success, in short, is not 
the criterion of reasonableness, any more than of right- 
-euusness, if by success is meant economic prosperity. It 
is in the light of a person's adjustment to Reality, to the 
conditions of social life, to the welfare and healthy devel- 
-opment of his community, that his reasonableness is to be 
judged, and from this point of view there is no contradiction 
in using the same term 'reasonable' in reference to both the
Intellectual and the moral spheres#
If it he asked, why is it more reasonable to be moral and
unselfish than to use all one's resources in furthering one's 
own personal ends, irrespectively of the welfare of others, 
the answer can only be that reason is the capacity of con- 
-forming to social Reality, and that social Reality consists 
of the welfare of the community, perhaps of all mankind, not
of any single individual only.
We may conclude, then, that reason has at least an analog- 
-ous function in the mental and moral spheres, and that in 
both spheres 'unreasonable' behaviour can be interpreted on 
the same psychological principles. Above all, the concept- 
-ion of freedom is not rendered untenable by the fact of 
unreasonable behaviour in moral matters. Just as the dis- 
-coveries of scientific enquiry and the results of historical
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or intellectual criticism are open to all men, in the degree 
to which their reason has developed and grown capable of 
understanding them, so all can share in the treasures of 
their moral heritage, their moral tradition, and even enrich 
that tradition with the fruits of their own vision, in the 
degree to which they have learned to act in accordance with 
reason, and to adapt their conduct to the facts of social 
Reality. This is the significance of freedom, and this is 
its ground. Freedom is neither magic power nor capricious 
license. It is neither an academic abstraction nor an unreal 
projection, the reverse side to the consciousness of impôt- 
-ence. It is bound up with the very birthright and supreme 
endowment of human beings, with that capacity in virtue of 
which both social and cultural life have emerged, with the 
ultimate force or impulse which is at the very root of all 
human striving and human development.
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Chapter VI.
FIRST PRINCIPLES IN ETHICS.
1.
Moral Progress.
The argument hitherto has made use of conceptions which 
have been stated only in very vague form, notably the ex- 
-pressions 'social Reality', 'conditions of social life', 
'regulations essential to the possibility of group-life'.
If these are what morality signifies, morality signifies, 
apparently, anything at all. For even the most casual glance 
at the history of men shows that social life has been main- 
-tained, temporarily at least, under the greatest diversity 
of moral regulations. The laws and customs which have pre- 
-vailed at different times, among different communities, seem 
almost to be legion. Scholars and travellers are still 
adding to our knowledge of them, and many classical accounts 
of them, such as those of Hobhouse and Westerma.rck, are 
already the familiar data of Ethics itself. If we find, 
then, as we do, that certain practices, such as slavery and 
infanticide, have been compatible with social life, and even 
with social life of a brilliant cultural level, by what right
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can such practices De 'morally' condemned? They have 
apparently been "conditions of social life", and no criterion 
has been indicated as yet in virtue of which they can be 
shown to be 'unreasonable' or 'immoral'.
A certain light is thrown on this question if we consider 
first of all the analogy which has been constantly emphasised 
above between social and physical Reality. It is clear that 
the variety of moral codes in human societies can be paralleled 
by an equally bewildering variety of intellectual or scient- 
-ific conceptions. The capacity of reason, it seems, in its 
endeavour to reach the laws and properties of physical Real- 
-ity, that is. Truth, has given birth to many theories which 
later have been recognised as crude or tentative. The 
ultimate nature of Reality is best represented, we saw above, 
as an ideal, of which the scientific hypotheses current in 
any age are to be regarded only as a more or less inadequate 
formulation. Yet in spite of this fact no one doubts that 
there are ultimate laws or properties of physical Reality, 
however imperfectly these laws may have been grasped, and 
however diversified men's conceptions of them may appear.
By analogy, then, it seems possible to understand "conditions 
of social life" or laws of social Reality as ultimate laws 
in a similar sense. In this sphere, too, the capacity of 
reason, in its endeavour to grasp the laws of social Reality,
7^
has given birth to many practices which later have been re- 
-cognised as tentative or crude. The ultimate nature o± 
social Reality, that is, in ethical terras. Goodness, is 
likewise best regarded as an ideal, of which the moral customs 
current in any age are only a more or less inadequate form- 
-ulation. However imperfectly, therefore, the character of 
social Reality may have been grasped, and however diversified 
may appear the conceptions and moral customs practised by 
groups of all ages, there seems no reason to doubt that there 
are here also ultimate laws or conditions which constitute
the nature of social Reality.
It would seem, then, on this analogy, that the criterion
in virtue of which, say, slavery and infanticide are to be 
judged.immoral is to be found in the same way as the crit- 
-erion of physical Reality. It is not a new problem, but 
a new aspect, rather, of the one problem. It is evidently 
analogous to the criterion whereby we judge the scientific 
conceptions of Aristotle less adequate than the formulation 
of Galileo, or deem the Hewtonian laws of motion less 
adequate than the theory of Relativity propounded by Einstein, 
It has to be admitted, of course, that the proDiem of the 
moral criterion is much more complicated than that of the 
physical. The discovery and proof of moral laws, it is 
evident, present far greater difficulties than the discovery
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and proof of physical laws. To verify a new conception of 
social Reality may involve many ages of human experiment, 
and speculation in these matters cannot be subjected to the 
same immediate test of the laboratory as can speculation in 
physics or chemistry. The examples of Prohibition in 
America or of Communism in Russia, within our own time, ill- 
-ustrate very vividly the peculiar difficulties in moral or
social experiment.
Hence the progress in reaching a more adequate conception 
of social Reality seems slow and uncertain, as compared with 
the progress in physical science. Most important of all, 
the very principles by which the fact of such progress is to 
be determined are far less understood or accepted in the case 
of social Reality. Yet on the empirical side it seems that 
the history of man does warrant the hypothesis of moral pro- 
-gress, and that there is sufficient evidence to justify an 
attempt to formulate the first principles of morals. Just 
as there have been landmarks in the growth of scientific 
knowledge, and a' succession of brilliant enquirers who have 
laboured to win some new vision of truth, so there have been 
landmarks in the history of moral development, and a succ- 
-ession of great poets and prophets who have proclaimed a new 
gospel of Goodness. The vision from Sinai, the teaching of 
the Hebrew prophets, the 'pagan' teaching of Socrates and
7^the Stoics, the coming of Christianity, the Renaissance and 
the French Revolution, the spread of democracy, these surely 
belie man's moral poverty or sloth, and give ground for that 
faith in moral progress which is the light of human life.
Hor is it sufficient to undermine this faith by pointing 
to man's failures in the past. In the few thousand years 
of civilized life there have been, it is true, many cultures. 
Each has run its appointed cycle, and collapsed apparently 
into nothingness. If Spengler's famous theory is correct, 
and these cultures are to be regarded as isolated phenomena, 
sporadic attempts to achieve conditions of social Reality, 
the fate of the modern Euro-American civilization, which 
represents the latest experiment in socisl Reality, is pro— 
-bably as gloomy as bpengler and his disciples paint it.
The next experiment, in Russia perhaps, may be more success- 
-ful. But it should be remembered that it is really by 
contact and interaction that a culture is born and develops. 
Our own Western attempt has been founded not apart from its 
predecessors but on their very ruins. The hypothesis of a 
world culture tradition (with its original source probably 
in Egypt, as Perry has lately suggested, in his "Children of 
the Sun") seems far more justified by the evidence than the 
hypothesis of independent culture-cycles, springing up some- 
-how or other and eventually dying, self-sufficient organisms
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which leave no seed.
It is a legitimate task for Ethics, then, to sift out 
the principles which underlie moral progress from the mass of 
empirical data available. It is only fair to add, however, 
that even in writers who adopt this empirical standpoint, and 
more particularly in the Ethics of Pragmatism, the assumption 
of first principles at all in this connection is disputed.
It will be necessary, therefore, to examine now whether the 
Pragmatic claim is itself valid, before the argument can be 
developed any further.
2.
A Defence of Ethical Principles.
The standpoint of Pragmatic Ethics is in many important 
respects similar to the position hitherto outlined here. It 
is characteristic of Pragmatism, for instance, to keep morals 
in the closest relation to actual life, rather than to find 
moral principles in an "unreal and transcendental" world, to 
quote Dewey's phrase. (Human Hature and Conduct, p.^O) Dewey 
holds that morals spring from "the make-up and working of 
human forces", (p.2), and that they are bound up with the 
facts of the environment in which these forces operate. But 
Dewey lays almost exclusive emphasis on the importance of
11
this social environment in forming moral habits or ideals.
He regards the problem of moral effort as solely one of re- 
-eonstructing or re-making this environment. He writes, for 
example, in one place, "Individuals with their exhortations, 
their preachings and scoldings, their inner aspirations and 
sentiments have disappeared, hut their habits endure, because 
these habits incorporate objective conditions in themselves. 
So will it be with ou,r activities. We may desire abolition 
of war, industrial justice, greater equality of opportunity 
for all. But no amount of preaching good will or the golden 
rule... will accomplish the results. There must be change 
in objective arrangements and institutions. We must work 
on the environment not merely on the hearts of men. To 
think otherwise is to suppose that flowers can be raised in 
a desert or.motor oars run in a jungle. Both things can 
happen,and without a miracle, but only by first changing the
jungle and desert." (ibid.pp.21—22)
The standpoint behind all this is to some extent akin to 
that which emphasised above varying conceptions or formulat- 
-ions of social Reality. But how is an i m p r o v e d  conception 
of social Reality reached? How, to take Dewey's illustrat- 
-ions, are the jungle and the desert to be changed? Are 
there no first principles for dealing with jungles or 
deserts? More generally, granted that the task of moral
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effort is to re-fashion the social environment, is the re- 
-fashioning not to be guided by any principles of ethical 
progress?
Pragmatism shrinks from admitting anything so remote from 
practical affairs as 'first principles'. It construes 
social Reality in its immediate connotation, as that which 
was. called above social Actuality. Just as the Real, for 
Pragmatic theory of knowledge, is that which is actually 
present in any particular act of knowing, so that is socially 
Real which forms part of any existing social environment.
It follows that the entire stress of moral effort is laid by 
Pragmatism on some immediate change in social conditions, no 
guidance whatever being offered with regard to the principles 
by which such change is to be affected. To believe in a 
single, fixed and final good, for instance, is, Dewey holds, 
"an intellectual product of that feudal organization which 
is disappearing historically and of that belief in a bounded, 
ordered cosmos, wherein rest is higher than motion, which has 
disappeared from natural science" (Reconstruction in Phil- 
-osophy, p.162). Pragmatism refuses to be preoccupied with 
general conceptions. Action for its own sake is taken to 
be the solution of all difficulties. As Carlyle's famous 
dictum urges, "Produce.' Were it but the pitifullest in- 
-finitesimal fraction of a Product, produce it, in God's
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nameî " (Sartor Resartus, The Everlasting Yea).
Dewey himself is thoroughly inconsistent, because he admits 
the conception of progress, as consisting in an "increment 
of meaning", but nowhere distinctly states what the criterion 
of that increment is to be. "Progress", he writes, is 
present reconstruction adding fullness and distinctness of 
meaning". "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof". 
"Every situation has its own measure and quality of progress". 
"Progress means increase of present meaning", and the categ- 
-orical imperative should read, "So act as to increase the 
meaning of present experience." Finally, "Till men give up 
the search for a general formula of progress they will not 
know where to look to find it" (Human Nature and Conduct,
pp.281-283).
Not only so, but the word 'principle* itself is anathema 
to Pragmatism. It is a "eulogistic cover for the fact of 
tendency." All that tendency imports is the "probable 
effect of a habit in the long run". It is sheer human con- 
-ceit, Dewey argues, to imagine there is any higher guarantee 
for the goodness of an action, that is, to imagine that 
Ethics can lay down any first principles by reference to 
which actions can be morally appraised. The role of chance 
is not to be omitted. "Luck, accident, contingency, plays 
its part." To imagine that there is any validity in such
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conceptions, as those of abstract justice or equality or 
liberty is to make morals that unreal and transcendental 
science, divorced from the actual facts of life, which v/as 
criticised above. Worst crime of all, "it is the source of 
all 'idealistic* utopia^" (ibid.pp.49, 47-48, 30).
Is this extreme view tenable? Is the attempt to form- 
-ulate first principles in Ethics not merely difficult, but 
thoroughly unsound in its very inception?
Pragmatism carries its dislike of theorizing too far, in 
this connection. There may be some usefulness, from the 
standpoint of immediate action, in emphasising the actual 
change which a situation requires, and in refusing to waste 
time over the discovery of what first principles are in- 
-volved. But it is surely evident that the immediate action, 
the change itself, expresses some idea or principle, however 
imperfectly thought out. The real choice is not betv/een 
action and theorizing, but between action which expresses a 
vaguely realised, imperfectly understood principle, or idea, 
and action which expresses an idea or principle more fully, 
more thoroughly understood. First principles are not ne- 
-cessarily the barren abstractions, the academic playthings, 
of which Pragmatism gives such a travesty. They are the 
mainsprings of practice itself, the standards by which 
"increment of meaning" can alone be estimated.
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Action which changes a situation, which relieves a present 
tension in a momentarily satisfactory way, may ultimately be 
more dangerous than no action at all# Yet Pragmatism allows 
of no criterion by which any choice can be made# If a 
person is extremely heated, for instance, as the result of 
violent exercise, and immediately quenches his thirst with a 
glass of iced water, he has 'done something', he has "in- 
-creased the meaning of his present experience", without 
having recourse to those barren abstractions, tiie first prin— 
-ciples of bodily health and functioning. "Sufficient unto 
the day is the evil thereof". It is sheer human conceit, 
according to Pragmatism, to ima.gine that remote first prin- 
-ciples about the circulation of the blood should enter into 
action of this kind. Does not such an instance show clearly 
that all action is prompted by some idea or principle, how- 
-ever crudely or vaguely conceived? What justiiication can 
there be, therefore, for preferring a less adequate idea, a 
less clearly understood idea, to one which is more adequate 
and more distinctly realised?
Further, it follows from the Pragmatic hostility to first , 
principles, and from the exclusive emphasis on the social 
environment in shaping moral practice, that moral progress, 
assuming that the conception is permitted at all, reduces to 
a matter of pure accident. If no legitimate place exists
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for reasoned thinking out of a situation and for action in 
accordance with general principles, the happenings of life 
must be just the product of chance, of something arbitrary. 
Dewey, it is highly significant to notice, does not shrink 
from this conclusion. "It is one of the ominous aspects of 
the history of man". We must face it, he writes, and re- 
-cognise "how little the progress of man has been the product 
of intelligent guidance, how largely it has been a by-product 
of accidental upheavals." "We have depended upon the clash 
of war, the stress of revolution, the emergence of heroic in- 
-dividuals, the impact of migrations generated by war and 
famine, the incoming of barbarians, to change established 
institutions." (Human Nature and Conduct, p.101)
Reasoning of this kind cannot withstand critical scrutiny. 
No doubt it is possible, for some limited purpose in view, 
to treat war and revolution and the rest as ultima.te facts. 
But the historian who would interpret has data as widely as 
possible cannot afford to regard these dramatic upheavals as 
discontinuous variations, real beginnings, springing up from 
nowhere, with no prior cause, great adamant rocks of bare 
action, devoid of any connection with human aspirations and 
human strivings. War and revolution and the others re- 
-present rather the converging, the localising, the meeting- 
-points, of ideas which have long been surging in men's
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hearts, of conditions which have long been moulding men s 
thoughts# It is the idea, the thought, tihe principle, which 
comes to a head in one of these dramatic outbursts# The 
outburst is only symbolic, an outward sign, evidence of the 
thought which it embodies. To take it as an ultimate fact, 
caused by nothing in particular, a mere casual or arbitrary 
by-product from which more human liberty or more human 
happiness or more humsn justice has fortunately, but quite 
accidentally, accrued, is no more than a gratuitous confession 
of impotence. It is to deny that a more complete analysis 
is possible or profitable because analysis up to a certain 
point offers a convenient halting-place. It is to confuse 
the immediate or predisposing factor with a complete causal 
explanation. It is to take as ultimate fact what is in 
itself only a partial and momentary phase of one continuous 
process.
There is no justification, then, is may be concluded, for 
denying the validity of an attempt to formulate ethical 
principles. Such an attempt must not be simply the exer- 
-cise of pure reflection on what can be logically deduced 
from an a priori concept of Duty, nor will it be the formal 
statement of the principles of an Ethics which is unreal and 
abstract and transcendental. The Pragmatic standpoint is 
a useful and necessary corrective to the excessively barren
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products of s, great deal of traditional ethical speculation. 
It is clear that Ethics cannot be legitimately lifted out of 
the actual setting of human forces and human institutions 
within which it may be said to exist. But within this field 
there is room,and need,for a broad, general survey of the 
facts, and for an attempt to reach the principles which those 
facts reveal.
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Chapter VII.
LIFE AND EQUALITY.
1.
Security of Life.
It is clear from the above discussion that the search 
for first principles, or the attempt to formulate the crit- 
-erion of moral progress, must proceed by surveying the 
different forms of social order that have been known in the 
past, and by sifting out those features which have apparently 
conduced to the survival of the group from those which have 
apparently conduced to its weakening or destruction. Such 
a survey cannot be wholly detached from preconceived ideas. 
Just as some vague hypothesis informs the outlook in every 
inductive survey, so, in Ethics, some such formulas as "The 
greatest Happiness of the greatest number" or "Life, Liberty, 
and the pursuit of Happiness", constitute the kind of pre- 
-conception meant. The exact problem, therefore, in the 
present connection is not so much the formulation of new 
principles as the examination of those principles which are 
universally felt to be fundamental. Experience presents us 
with many forms of social order, many attempts to express 
social Reality. It is from conclusions based on this
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experience that the starting-point of an enquiry into ethical 
principles must be taken. Can these conclusions be sus- 
-tained by appeal to the widest range of knowledge and the 
most searching criticism or analysis?
The first principle of Ethics, then, can be described as 
Security of Life. The degree of effectiveness with which 
the physical maintenance and security of the group are 
achieved measures the possibility of cultural attainment.
We may say that the need for security of life, as expressed 
in the prohibition of murder, constitutes the first principle 
of morality. It is clear that if the members of a group 
were permitted to kill each other whenever their impulses 
prompted, no social or common life would be possible at all. 
Nor can any instance be adduced from history of a group which 
sanctioned indiscriminate killing and succeeded in maintain- 
-ing itself. The need for security of life is such a fund- 
-amental feature of social Reality that it may be said to 
rank as a moral truth, analogous to those elementary truths 
about physical Reality, such as the law that fire burns, or 
the statement that "two plus two equals four". It is 
immediately verifiable, a condition, in short, without which 
social life can nowhere and at no time be maintained.
The curious sect of the Thags, who practised murder as a 
sacred religious rite to their Goddess, and were completely
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untroubled by any moral scruples in the prosecution of their 
task; does not contradict what has been claimed. For the 
Thags confined their victims to non-Thags, and there is no 
question in their case of a group which permitted promiscuous 
internal killing. Practices of human sacrifice are a mod- 
-ified form of this same class of rite, and leave the ar- 
-gument similarly unaffected.
The Ethics of Buddhism constitute perhaps a more inter- 
-esting problem. The vision of Gautama seems to be crudely 
expressible in this way. Suffering is the necessary con- 
-comitant of existence: suffering comes from desire: and the 
only adequate way of removing desire is to cease existing.
The end of life, therefore, is Nirvana, the negation of 
desire or thought. It might seem, too, that a theory which 
raises 'equilibrium* to be the goal of mental activity, as 
7/as suggested above, logically implies some such ideal of 
nothingness, since with every increase of complexity in the 
situation to which the organism responds the possibility of 
attaining equilibrium recedes more and more.
But it has to be remembered that security of life is a 
first principle of morals only on the assumption that social 
order, that is, the maintenance of the human species, is 
necessary. Ethics has been shown, above, to be essentially 
bound up with the maintenance of common or group life. If
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it is denied that there is any justification for the laain- 
-tenance of life there is obviously no room for Ethics. 
Conditions of social life are only worth enquiry if it is 
granted that social life is itself the all-inclusive good. 
Nor is the argument from an abstract sense of the concept 
'equilibrium* any more valid. For equilibrium does not 
mean the absolute cessation of activity. It means activity 
which represents the maxintum adjustment possible within the 
given situation. Even in thermodynamics, from which the 
concept was borrowed, it is not a static ideal. (Theoret- 
-ically, at minus 273 degrees, all existence ceases: but 
such a limit merely states the given outer circumference, as 
it were, of the circle within which theorizing takes placeJ. 
In moral matters, it is within a setting composed of life 
and its maintenance that ethical theory proceeds, and it is 
only with reference to that setting that it is even relevant. 
It is difficult to see on what grounds the maintenance of 
life can be denied a good, because it constitutes the one 
all-inclusive setting from which grounds or arguments derive 
their validity.
The prohibition of murder, then, is a first principle of 
morals, or a 'moral law*. It applies of course only to 
human life, since it is the existence of the human species 
which is the ultimate goal: and in most modern communities
men's impulses to kill have been diverted from human ob- 
-jects on to animal ones, with socially valuable results.
The vivisection controversy, in so far as it is a moral one, 
is simply decided on the view that it is the existence of 
the human species, with all that this implies, and not the 
existence of life in all forms, life as such, which is the 
moral end. The Cartesians were sound in their practice, at 
le%st, however doubtful the automaton theory of animal life 
from wnich they proceeded.
No existing form of social Reality, it must be admitted, 
is wholly free from occasional violations of this moral in- 
-junction to refrain from murder. But the rarity of such 
violations is a good test of the moral stability of the 
group in question, and of the sensitiveness, perhaps, of the 
moral consciousness of the members of the community. On 
the reverse side, at any rate, that is, the taking of life 
by the group or society where the existence of the group has 
been threatened, this sensitiveness is very clearly shown.
The number of crimes, for instance, now punishable by death 
shows, in Britain, a striking contrast to the position even 
a hundred years ago. It seems as if the conviction were 
growing that human life represents the supreme moral end, 
and that only in the most extreme necessity should the group 
destroy that which is the very condition of moral attainment.
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2.
Sex-Regulation.
Closely connected with security of life is the regulation 
of sexual impulses. The necessity for this is not perhaps 
so immediately obvious as in the case of murder, but it is 
really prior to murder. Probably, in other words, the im- 
•-pulse to murder had its roots originally in sex-desire.0 
It is clear, at any rate, that among the strongest impulses 
of human beings are those derived from the sexual instincts. 
Their strength is such that, as was noted above, they prove 
the least amenable to control by the Reality-principle: and 
it is the imperfect control of these impulses which leads to 
a very large proportion of social maladjustment. Now, even 
on biological grounds alone, the control of sexual instincts 
is imperative to the maintenance of the group: and such 
control becomes more and more severe as the group achieves 
an increasing measure of cultural development.
It is natural to find, then, that beneath the diversity 
of all known moral codes there is a common fact of sex- 
-regulation. Its details vary considerably, and often the 
control is punctuated by periodic outbursts of license,
i ” —
Bovet's "The Fighting Instinct" (1923) shows,for instance, 
how there is originally always a close relation between 
the sexual and the fighting impulses.
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masked in some cases even under the guise of 'religion'. 
Sometimes a man is permitted several wives, sometimes a 
woman Is permitted several husbands (as, for example, among 
the Nairs of the Malabar Coast). But, whatever the details 
or the degree of the restraint imposed, a marriage-tie of 
some kind is an invariable feature of successful group- 
-maintenance. The regulation of sex-impulses, then, would 
seem to constitute another fundamental condition of social 
life, another 'moral law'. Even in Platonic or modern 
forms of Communism the principle of regulation is not ignored. 
Indeed, the fact that the word morality has in popular usage 
an almost exclusively sexual connotation would seem to in- 
-dicate that regulation of sex-impulses is the most fund- 
-amental condition of all, in social Reality, Thus, among 
the Jewish people, it is customary to read a portion of the 
Mosaic Law on every occasion of public worship, and it is not 
a little significant that on the Day of Atonement, which is 
the most important occasion in the whole religious life of 
the people, the portion traditionally read is that section 
in Leviticus which deals with the forbidden relations or 
forbidden degrees in marriage.
There are, then, elementary moral laws of this kind, or 
basic conditions essential to the very possibility of social 
life and the maintenance of the species. But just as the
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physical universe is conceived as an interrelated system, so 
the conditions of social Reality cannot be stated any more 
exactly in abstraction, but constitute an interrelated whole. 
To ascertain, therefore, which particular sex-régulâtions are 
most likely to secure social wellbeing is not feasible at thi, 
stage. The claim of the Eugenists to have formulated a 
better expression of social Reality has to be examined in the 
light of all the other principles involved. It is not suff- 
-icient to decide, with the 'stunt' Press, that Peers should 
marry Ch.prus-girls, or to point out, with the American psy- 
-chologist Knight Dunlap, that cabaret-girls are recruited 
from just the most desirable type of mates for intellectuals. 
Details of this kind can only be adjudged when the nature of 
social Reality has been elucidated more thoroughly.
3.
The Principle of Equality:
The most notable feature which can be detected in the 
data from which the moral criterion is constructed consists 
in an increase of the range of persons who participate 
equally in the privileges of group life. If, then, there 
are any first principles at all in moral science, any fund- 
-amental tendencies the operation of which is revealed in
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the successive expressions of social order which the history 
of man exhibits, this principle of equality must rank as the 
most significant of all. The conception of 'liberty' makes 
perhaps a more vivid appeal to sentiment, because the very 
existence of social life seems to run counter to the crude 
notion of absolute freedom. But the logical ground of 
liberty itself is equality. It is only because human beings 
have equal worth, and should not therefore suffer restrict- 
-ions from which other people are freed, that the concept of 
liberty seems such a self-evident principle of Ethics.
The great moral revolutions in the history of Western 
civilizations can be legitimately interpreted as simply 
attempts to realise more and more completely this condition 
of Equality. It was, for instance, an integral feature of 
Stoic teaching. "We are all fellow-subjects", writes 
Aurelius, "and, as such, members of one body-politic." "The 
first principle in ma,n's constitution is community." (The 
Thoughts of î/iarcus Aurelius, IV.4, and VII.33) It was the 
salient mark of Christian teaching that it insisted on the 
absolute worth of the individual, high or low. The basis 
of the Jus Naturale, which constituted, as was pointed out 
above, the strength of Roman Jurisprudence, was again the 
tacit belief that men are equs.1. The same conception was 
the inspiration behind Magna Charta, behind the American
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Declaration of Independence, behind the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man at the revolutionary epoch in the history of 
France, It is, too, the main source of that moral appeal 
which is so vividly enforced in the writings of the founders 
of British Socialism. For the industrial organisation of 
modern societies has long outgrown the moral categories by 
which it was originally informed, and the glaring inequalities 
of Distribution which are now its concomitant constitute one 
of the admitted imperfections in modern formulations of 
social Reality.
Writers on Ethics have of course themselves been conscious 
of the place of equality in the moral life, and have given it 
emphasis in different ways. It is implied, for instance, in 
Kant's deduction of the categorical imperative of duty from 
the nature of rational beings. "Act", Kant's maxim runs, "so 
as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that 
of others, always as an end, never merely as a means." This 
can be justified only if a basis of equality is assumed, that 
is, if all human beings are assumed to have equal, absolute 
worth. Similarly, in the formula of Utilitarianism, "Every 
one to count for one and no one for more than one", the same 
principle of equality is presupposed. Sidgwick expresses it 
in only a slightly modified form. In Green's "Prolegomena", 
again, there is a detailed analysis of the development of the
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moral ideal, and it is suggested that such development con- 
-sists in "a gradual extension... of the range of persons to 
whom the common good is conceived as common." The limit of 
this extension must, it is shown, coincide with the whole of 
humanity, so that part at least of the criterion of moral 
development is the measure in which other people are included 
as equally participating in a construction of social Reality. 
"It is not". Green writes, "the sense of duty to a neighbour, 
but the practical answer to the question Who is my neighbour? 
that has varied" (Prolegomena to Ethics, section 207). It 
is evident, then, that this extension of duty to the whole of 
humanity rests on an implied principle of universal human 
equality, and that, in these various formulations, equality 
is tacitly assumed as the underlying first principle of 
Ethics.
But, as stated in these forms, the principle of equality 
has a certain abstractness. As Dewey points out, in a 
different context, "Ideals of justice or peace or equality... 
are not things self-enclosed to be known by introspection. 
Like thunderbolts and tubercular disease and the rainbow they 
can be known only by extensive and minute observation of 
consequences incurred in action." (Human Nature and Conduct, 
p.37) The conception of equality in particular is so vague 
that it lends itself very readily to intellectual abuse and
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to misinterpretation. The doctrine of 'Natural Rights', 
for instance, associated with Rousseau and eighteenth century- 
political thought, rests on a radically abstract conception 
of equality. The equality of men does not imply, as this 
theory assumes, that each individual has a certain quotu^ of 
rights (such as the right to live, to marry, to enjoy per- 
-sonal freedom) simply in virtue of having been born, and 
that law or society dare not interfere with the enjoyment of 
these rights. Such an interpretation of equality lays all 
the emphasis,on 'rights', and ignores the correlative con- 
-ception of 'duties', which rights necessarily imply. It 
exaggerates the role of the individual, and depreciates the 
role of society, in the attainment of moral or social order. 
It is only within the setting of a social order that rights 
or duties have any meaning at all.
Again, equality does not imply that every member of a 
group should have exactly the same amount of possessions, as 
crude expositions of socialism at one time suggested. It is 
not to be imagined that human beings are an aggregate of 
indistinguishable units or dots, exactly the same in every 
respect. As Hegel showed, in his 'Philosophy of Right', 
equality should not be construed as an abstract sameness or 
bare identity. If equality implies anythihg at all with 
regard to possessions, it can only be in respect to the
91
of ownership. All men are equal in the sense 
that they are possible possessors, but this is not incompat- 
-ible with there being differences between individuals in 
the amount of possessions they own, provided that, as Hegel 
says, such differences reflect differences of talent, energy, 
character, in siiort, the various elements which go to con— 
-stitute personality.
Any merely abstract interpretation of equality, then, must 
omit something of the full nature of this moral principle. 
Where, then, can it be studied more concretely? Where, to 
return to Dewey's phrase, can 'extensive and minute observ- 
—ation of consequences incurred in action* be carried out in 
connection with equality?
There are partial embodiments of equality in the actual
institutions and sentiments of past or present societies.
In particular, the working of Democracy, which is at first
sight perhaps more a political than an ethical conception,
affords the best clue to the moral implications of equality.
For the life of the democratic communities in Europe and
America and the British Colonies offers the mearest approach
to the attainment of equality that the history of men can as
yet reveal. It is a far cry from the Athens of Pericles to
Hew York of to-day. But what was confined to a few privileged
citizens in the former is now the common possession of
literally millions of the great community that comprises the 
latter.
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4.
The Working of Democracy.
Democracy as a form of government, or a technical system 
of political administration, is comparatively old in the 
history of the world. But in Ethics its application is not 
so familiar. Yet democracy embodies the very essence of the 
moral ideal. It was "to make the world safe for democracy" 
that an American idealist, in the European War, urged his 
countrymen to give their lives on the soil of France and 
Belgium. In this sense the democratic sentiment is the 
fundamental principle of Ethics, a passionate conviction of 
•men's hearts, a faith which is the driving power behind all 
efforts to maintain and improve social life.
The most clearly marked feature of the democratic sentiment, 
as it is embodied in, say, present-day America, is the attempt 
to secure equality of opportunity for every member of the 
community. It is tacitly understood that each individual, 
whatever his birth or parentage, is entitled to strive for 
all the prizes which his group has to offer. If he is able 
to appropriate the best in life, the conditions of the group 
are such that the appropriation is made possible. Striking 
instances of this are a feature of American industrial life.
Men born with no privilege of caste or influence have become,
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through sheer grit or genius, great pioneers of business and 
leaders of industry, triumphing over every obstacle of nature 
or circumstance. The only condition of success, in the 
truly democratic or moral community, should lie in men's 
ability and determination to succeed. In America, theoret- 
-ically, a condition of this kind is more nearly realised than
anywhere else. The sentiment of democracy ig. taken for
granted, universally, like religion in a priest. Only the 
evils incidental to modern industrial development, and the 
loopholes offered to the weaknesses of human nature by this 
factor, have partly impaired the realisation in practice of 
the moral sentiment which originally inspired the community. 
But, on the positive side, there is an amazing freedom from 
conventional or artificial restrictions on the attainment 
of industrial success.
Equality of opportunity, however, does not mean that all 
differences between members of the democratic community are 
obliterated. On the contrary, it serves to enhance diff- 
-erences of ability or actual achievement. There are no 
artificial distinctions, for instance, in America, no peer- 
—ages nor hereditary titles, but there are real differences
between individuals, and the test of these differences is
just the test of actual capacity or achievement. This cor- 
-ollary of the truly democratic sentiment is probably what
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underlies the cult (or catchword) of 'efficiency'. A man 
IS measured by his efficiency, by the way he does what he 
professes to be able to do. She coamunity guarantees an 
opportunity to reap the rewards of efficiency, and measures 
the distinction between its members by the degree of effic- 
-iency to which each attains, estimated in terms of some 
common standard. Democracy is not, therefore, synonymous 
with slackness or ease. Even the great natural resources of 
America do not sustain its population without the keenest 
effort on the part of the citizens. As was said of iturger's 
Bohemia, 'Vae Victis' is perhaps a not unfitting motto to 
stand outside the gates of the modern democratic community 
also. But, such being the general temper of the community, 
there is usually as a consequence an atmosphere of eager, 
pulsing life, a spirit of enterprise or adventure, which sprint 
from the basis of equal opportunity, and are inspired by the 
legitimate hope of great and worthy prizes. The best in
life is within the reach of all, if a man has the endurance 
and the capacity to attain it.
!■■■&
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It is important, of course, not to confuse what is in- 
-herent or essential in the working of democracy with certain 
by-products which are merely transitional, due to the com- 
-parative immaturity of all existing democracies. The effect 
of the democratic outlook is, to begin with, a process of 
diffusion, or levelling, and the movement from above down- 
-wards seems more noticeable at first than the movement from 
below upwards. The main effect, therefore, of a tentative 
democracy seems to be to introduce more uniformity, more 
imitation, more monotony of type. It is curious to observe, 
for instance, in a city like Hew York the uniformity of men's 
clothes, the monotony of rows and rows of identically con- 
-structed apartment houses, the gregariousness of the people's 
mental and social responses.
Illustrations of the same fact, in rather a different dress, 
are found in the spread of 'popular' science and philosophy 
in a mass of widely-read journals, and in the character even 
of American scientific work. For in that sphere there is 
much more detailed, highly specialised and minute record of 
facts than there is attempt to correlate results in the light 
of first principles. It is as if there were a democratic 
suspicion of first principles as too exclusive, too aristo- 
-cratic. In Sociology, which American writers have made 
very largely their ovm, this is specially marked. In
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Philosophy, reference has already been made to a similar 
characteristic of Pragma.tism, the chief American movement in 
recent times. The whole philosophy of James, in fact, is 
an apotheosis of democracy, a criticism of the 'vicious in- 
-tellectualism' of idealistic or aristocratic systems: and 
its constant emphasis is on the side of 'radical empiricism', 
on the side of actual facts, on the sordid and muddy streaks 
of real life.
All this, however, represents only one aspect of the whole 
situation. There is in addition a movement really percept- 
-ible towards a higher diffused standard of well-being and 
culture. On the physical or material side it is very clearly 
marked. The standard of living, the facilities for rapid 
transportation, the material comforts and inventions of the 
age, have nowhere been so fully developed and utilised as in 
the democratic communities. The realms of music, too, and 
of art, of opera and the drama, are less exclusively the 
possession of a single leisured class. In every sphere it 
is as if the highest point and the lowest were being grad- 
-ually pressed together to meet each other in a middle level, 
and aa If, with the abolition of extremes at either end, the 
subsequent process were to consist in a raising of this 
level, as the common possession of every member of the comm- 
-unity.
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Directness and simplicity of outlook are characteristic 
of American democracy also. Accidental or trivial factors 
are quickly brushed aside, and essentials clearly envisaged. 
This leads, on the one hand, to a certain absence of feel- 
-ing for tradition or for the amenities of social life, and 
to a certain almost callousness of outlook. Nothing is 
sacred, not even marriage or religion or death. On the 
other hand, the simplicity of outlook often degenerates into 
mere credulity, and some of the Greek philosophers' analyses 
of the dangers of democracy are illustrated in America. The 
relation between the sexes is an interesting feature of the 
system. Men concentrate all the results of their business 
ability on the adornment of their mates, and the women, 
recognising apparently the fundamental importance of their 
function as mates, place upon themselves a much more exact- 
-ing standard in personal attractiveness than elsewhere, 
(this is meant of course to apply generally and diffusedly, 
not to a special class only), and turn themselves out with 
remarkable charm. There is very little glamour or false 
sentiment about the marriage-tie. The life of the commun- 
-ity, however, is a real partnership between men and women, 
and the frank comradeship of the sexes reflects the direct- 
-ness of outlook from which it ultimately springs.
Life, then, in the truly democratic community has a
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certain stimulus and intensity. Where every source of 
human betterment and culture, every channel of recreation or 
achievement, are within the reach of all, in the measure of 
their capacity to utilise them, life is full to overflowing. 
The knowledge of great rewards open to all, the feeling of 
participation in a vast common enterprise of ambition and 
daring, bestow on the individual a consciousness of power 
which is exhilarating. If the full significance of the 
democratic conception could be thoroughly realised, and its 
implications completely incorporated in the actual every-day 
lives and habits of men and women, the community would be 
magnificently alive, electric, pulsing. Democracy, in short, 
is not an obstacle to the development of personality. So 
far from weakening individual initiative it affords it the 
very strongest stimulus. The range and scope of the de- 
-velopfeent of personality are enlarged, its field of ex- 
-pression widened and enriched. For personality is not a 
mysterious something which flowers in isolation. It is in 
the range and degree to which an individual has assimilated 
the social environment, the extent to which he has made his 
own that common wealth of social tradition and achievement 
into which he is born and among the expressions of which he 
lives, that he attains the highest reaches of his own 
development.
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Such, then, is a more concrete account of equality as 
the fundamental principle of Ethics. Social Reality, it 
may be said, should be judged by this criterion at any rate, 
namely, the range of persons who partidipate equally in the 
life of the group and its privileges. Equality of opp- 
-ortunity has as its correlate, we have seen, differences 
of natural capacity and endowment. But, within that setting 
of different abilities and different capacities, equality 
is the fundamental principle in morals.
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Chapter VIII.
THE CHIEF GOOD W  END.
1.
The Conception of a Chief Good.
It has been shown now that there are elementary moral 
laws, such as the prohibition of murder, regulation of sex- 
-relations, and the like, which may be said to comprise the 
conditions essential to the possibility of social life. It 
has been claimed also that the formal presupposition of moral 
progress is the principle of equality. There now emerges 
the question of the content of social life. Granted that 
every member of a group should have equal opportunity, the 
question remains, equal opportunity for what? In other 
words, what is the end of the life of the community? In 
addition to elementary laws regarding security of life, which 
are common to all moral codes, there is an immense variety 
of moral regulations revealed by the history of Ethics. The 
basic, common laws are readily explicable. But what of the 
subsequent divergence? What is the criterion in virtue of 
which this content can be morally appraised?
It might be said that this variety of detail merely re- 
-flects the different conceptions of social Reality that
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have prevailed in different places at different times, or 
that, since the formulation of a moral code represents the 
effort of reason to discover the essential conditions of 
social life, and reason is itself a developing capacity, it 
is only natural to find that the conception of these social 
conditions has varied. In other words, the diversity in 
moral regulations reflects differing degrees of reason, or 
differing forms of rational Insight into the conditions of 
social life. Each race or community, it might he said, has 
a certain native stock of mental endowment, which enables it 
to attain a certain degree of rational adjustment to the en- 
-vironment with which it is confronted. It is a matter of 
group intelligence.
But such a reply leaves still undecided the criterion by 
reference to which degrees of rational adjustment are to be 
themselves appraised. There are such things as group in- 
-telligence tests. Is there any ultimate test by which the 
different conceptions of social life can be placed in a 
scale of reasonableness? Granted that the content of 
different social orders is more or less rational, what kind 
of content marks an increase in rationality, an advance in 
the attainment of social Reality? If complete equality 
among the members of a community were realised, and all had 
equal opportunities of participating in social life, would
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such a community be perfectly moral, independently of the 
kind of life each were free to follow? Is there no 'higher' 
and 'lower', no 'better' and 'worse', in the content of 
social life?
It is this question which the traditional conception of 
the 'summum bonum' or chief good is designed to meet. The 
question cannot be dismissed, in the phrase of Dewey quoted 
above, as "an intellectual product of the feudal organisation" , 
because the Greeks envisaged it in the same way. The view 
which has the backing of common-sense, and which has at the 
same time distinguished literary and philosophical support, 
is the view that Happiness is the ultimate end of social 
life. That form of society is more reasonable, it may be 
urged, or higher, or better, according as it produces more 
happiness among its members. Is this view adequate?
2 .
Happiness as the End.
It is unnecessary to elaborate here the traditional ob- 
-jectlons which have been brought against Hedonism, from 
the Cyrenaic or Epicurean forms of the creed down to the 
most recent expressions in Universalistic Hedonism. It may 
be pointed out again that Pleasure is in itself an abstraction.
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It marks the removal or diminution of tension, the control 
of stimulation, and the pleasurable tone of specific modes 
of response has an ultimate biological significance for the 
survival of the individual. But to set up a definite entity, 
the feeling of pleasure, as the end of action, is merely 
verbal abstraction, and the interminable disputes about 
Hedonism which presuppose such an entity are wholly unreal and 
profitless. The springs of action, we have seen, are the 
instinctive impulses, the most prolific source of tension 
within the organism, and the removal of tension, or satis- 
-faction, as it is usually called in ethical terms, is the 
only possible end of action for an individual. The ethical 
problem is really distinct from this altogether. It is.
Which impulses of individuals should the coiimiunity permit to 
be satisfied, and what form of satisfaction is to be favoured?
Even on the psychological side, Hedonism is a confused 
statement of the facts. It is no doubt biologically sig- 
-nifleant.that a pleasurable tone characterises responses 
which remove or decrease tension. That fact offers an im- 
-portant indication for future guidance and discrimination 
in behaviour. But it is not in the least a sufficient 
warrant for hypostasizing an abstraction, pleasure, as the 
end of action. It is the removal of some particular tension, 
the satisfaction of some particular impulse, which is
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invariably the end of action. Thus it is sometimes asked, 
in these discussions of Hedonism to which reference has been 
made. Can we choose to do an action which will not be pleas- 
-urable? The question seems to present difficulty only be- 
-cause tv/o conceptions are confused, (a) the satisfaction 
which the resolving of every tension necessarily yields to an 
individual, and (b) pleasure in the abstract. We cannot 
choose to do anything except resolve some present tension, 
and success in this is pleasurable. But we can (and in 
point of fact nearly always choose to resolve a tension 
which involves leaving unresolved certain other tensions. It 
then appears as if the resultant state were on balance not 
pleasurable, or as if we had chosen to do something not 
pleasurable.
It should be remembered that the present tensions which 
affect an individual depend on the past experience of the 
organism. They are fed and increased by present removal, 
and those tensions which have been resolved in the past, to 
the accompaniment of pleasurable tone, tend to recur in a 
still stronger measure. This fact, which again is readily 
explicable on biological grounds, accounts for the supposed 
desire of pleasure which action is held to reveal. The 
removal of tension is always pleasurable, but there is no 
fixed entity 'pleasure' whicii can be sought in its own
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right. The organism tends to remove those tensions which 
have been efficiently treated in the past, not to procure an 
abstract something called pleasure.
Again, the paradox of Hedonism, as it is called, or the 
fact that, as Bradley puts it, pleasure is found there most 
where it is least sought, is readily interpreted on this 
analysis. What is signified by the paradox is simply that 
the organism, in its so-called search for pleasure, is 
attempting to resolve a tension immediately and narrowly and 
directly, without incorporating into its response the full 
complexity of its nature. If a tension is complex (for in- 
-stance, the impulse of a trained musician to hear good music) 
it cannot be resolved immediately or wholly by a simple re- 
-sponse, (for instance, listening to a barrel-organ). Such 
a simple response is not accompanied by pleasurable tone, and 
this is the ground for the view that the search for pleasure 
defeats its own end. But even here, it may be noted, there 
are simple tensions, such as those of hunger or thirst or 
of the senses, where a simple réponse does prove adequate to 
resolve them, and where a pleasurable tone does follow. On 
the traditional view, these would have to be classified as 
an exception to the paradox of Hedonism (as is done, for in- 
-stance, by Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I.IV.2). But on 
the present analysis they illustrate the importance of the
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complexity of the tension in question as the deciding factor.
Further, feeling varies with the degree of tension it re- 
-presents, and the satisfaction of a very acute tension, such 
as a keen appetite or thirst, affords a more intense relief 
than if the tension had been simpler or less acute. This 
shows 'that any abstract discussion of 'feeling' as an entity
separable from the total, content of consciousness, to use
Green's phrase, is profitless and indeed irrelevant.
On all these grounds, then. Hedonism cannot be accepted as 
an accurate account even of individual behaviour. The im- 
-portance of pleasurable tone as a sign of successful funct- 
-ioning, its value as a guide to future action, have perhaps 
rendered it easy to isolate what appears to be a common factor 
in all useful response, and to elevate this abstraction to 
become the 'end' of conduct. But if psychological Hedonism 
is vulnerable, the Ethical Hedonism which rests on it can be
still less justified. If the hypothesis which Hedonism
suggests regarding individual human nature, and the statement 
it makes regarding the law which regulates individual funct- 
-ioning, are themselves not accurate, the transition from 
psychological Hedonism to Ethical Hedonism, to the view that 
pleasure is the moral end, something one ought to seek, seems 
thoroughly arbitrary. l^Vhat is implied in the conception of 
'ought' or 'duty'?
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2.
The Concept of Duty.
It has been maintained above that morality is essentially 
bound up with social or group life. The conception of duty, 
therefore, or of 'ought', can only be interpreted with re- 
-ference to some form of group life. If this is done, it 
appears to rest on two facts, (a) that individual impulses, 
individual desires or hopes or ambitions, do actually clash 
in practice with the security, the survival, the well-being, 
of the group as a whole, and (b) that individuals come, as 
the result of training or suggestion or reflection, to 
identify their own wellbeing with that of their group, and to 
subordinate their own desires, in the event of a clash, to 
the wellbeing of the community. The reason that such a clash 
is possible must simply be the fact that human life has not 
always been social, and that in the period of evolution which 
preceded social life man acquired impulses which are now 
deeply rooted in his, structure, but which are definitely non- 
-social, or selfish, or egoistic. In the effort to adapt 
behaviour to Reality, that is, to the conditions of social 
life, man is unable to gratify all these selfish impulses 
directly, but in virtue of his reason he is able to deny or 
postpone certain satisfactions. This is what makes social
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life possible at all, and this is what introduces the fact
of duty or 'ought*.
V/hat duty involves, then, is the identification of per- 
-sonal wellbeing with social order, and the subordination, 
in consequence, of personal or egoistic impulses. If it 
is asked, m y  should a man subordinate his own personal im- 
-pulses to the welfare of his group? the only logically 
adequate answer is that social life is necessary even for 
the bare existence and wellbeing of the individual. It is 
possible, of course, to maintain that the concept of duty 
requires for its interpretation some metaphysical or relig- 
-ious hypothesis which places the end of the moral life out- 
-side the moral life itself. The importance for practical 
life, at the present stage of development, of a religious 
hypothesis in particular is so great that no society could 
stand the strain of its removal. Even the moral reliance 
of a Kant does not despise the doctrines of Christianity, and 
the effects of the 'Religion of Humanity', the bare service 
of mankind, have been negligible in their influence on the 
lives of the great majority. The best test will probably 
be provided in the future development of Religion in Russia. 
But, formally, the essence of duty can be most simply de- 
-scribed as the preference for common life, with all that it 
implies, over the immediate satisfaction of selfish or
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egoistic impulses, and. the actual content of duty for any 
individual reflects the social conditions of his community, 
the measure of his rational insight into the nature of
social Reality,
The fact that moral effort is so often associated with 
devotion to others, with renunciation of private satis- 
-factions, with self-sacrifice, is thus readily intelligible. 
It testifies to the great strength of egoistic impulses, as 
well as to the imperative necessity for their regulation, if 
social life is to be maintained. But, it need scarcely be 
pointed out, it is only within an implied social context 
that asceticism can have moral significance. Outside of 
such a context its interest concerns abnormal psychology 
almost exclusively, where its antecedents in what is called 
the 'masochistic' aspect of certain impulses are traced. It 
is not valid, therefore, to take Duty or Righteousness as 
the end of social life, or to find in self-sacrifice and 
renunciation, for their own sake, the ultimate moral good. 
But, within this setting of social life, the concept of duty, 
with its corollary of renunciation, does emphasise a fund- 
-amental feature of moral analysis. The bare concept of 
duty, in other words, does not solve the problem of the chief 
good or end: but it serves at least to indicate the gap in 
the transition from psychological to ethical Hedonism.
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It might be urged that duty, or the 'categorical imper- 
-ative', is itself only a datum for psychological analysis.
It refers, it might be said, to factors of individual de- 
-velopment, to the way in which there develop in a person 
moral feelings, opinions, standards, ideals, under the in- 
-fluence of social habits or institutions or laws, parental 
authority, unconscious or repressed desires. But this is 
again to ignore the specific feature of the ethical problem. 
Ho amount of psychological statement about human functioning 
or development can be substituted, without fallacy, for an 
explanation of that subordination of personal to social 
wellbeing which constitutes the formal nature of duty.
The facts are not in any v/ay obscure. When it is pointed 
out by Socrates, for instance, that some pleasant things 
are not good, what is meant is that the satisfaction of 
certain egoistic impulses must be postponed or denied, in 
the interests of social order. When a person says, "Ho, I 
won't do that, it is not right", what is implied is that the 
person associates 'right', in virtue of his past training, 
social heritage, reflection, with that which is essential 
to the wellbeing and maintenance of his group, or even of 
humanity, and that he has identified his own ultimate welfare 
with this welfare of his group or of humanity. In short. 
Hedonism as the moral end represents confused analysis. The
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facts point quite clearly to the dependence of the moral 
end on social life, not to the application of a psychological 
law (inaccurately stated at that) about individual functioning 
to the wholly distinct problem of Ethics proper. The real 
problem of Ethics is the significance of the existence, of 
laws, social habits, and the rest. Whether it be maintained 
that these are an expression of something in human nature, in 
life, or testify to a soul, or to some religious doctrine, or 
whether it be even maintained that they are the product of 
external and accidental factors, physical or geographical or 
economic, it is their social implication which sets the 
ethical problem: and psychological analysis of individual 
development, beyond which Hedonism cannot legitimately pass, 
does not furnish an adequate interpretation of moml conduct.
4.
Increase of Complexity in Life.
If Happiness, then, is not an accurate account of the 
Chief Good, what the end which social life subserves?
What mark or characteristic of social order makes that order 
more rational, or higher, or better? Can we find an ob- 
-jective test, for instance, in cultural products, such as 
literature, music, art, and the like?
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These objective products, when analysed, seem to be re- 
-ducible to what is merely an increase of complexity in 
social order. Cultural and civilized life are in the last 
resort only a more complex form of social existence than that 
which subserves merely physical welfare. For the maintenance 
of these more complex conditions there are required more 
numerous, more varied, and more delicately sensitive moral 
regulations. Primitive or elemental virtues, like courage 
and sincerity, have to be supplemented in modern communities 
by tactfulness and diplomacy. The different forms of social 
life,.then, and the varying conceptions of social Reality 
which the history of Ethics reveals, can be classified as 
embodying greater or less complexity in the adjustment of men 
to their environment.
But, it will be urged, is complexity the only standard by 
which forms of social life can be differentiated? Is there 
not an intrinsically higher and lower? Are some forms of 
life not intrinsically good? In traditional terms, are 
some pleasures not higher than others? Is there not a 
difference of kind?
There does not seem to be any way of establishing a valid 
difference of kind among pleasures. It is often taken as 
obvious that pleasures du differ in kind. Even Mill admits 
such a difference, though it weakens the basis of his whole
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ethical position. Mackenzie, for instance, writes, "That 
certain forms of will are higher or better than others, may 
almost be said to be the fundamental.assumption of Ethics.
How it follows from this that certain desires, or certain 
universes of desire, are higher or better than others."
(Manual of Ethics, p.210). But, on a strict analysis, the 
so-called higher pleasures, that is, the pleasures of the 
intellectual or artistic worlds, are merely more complex 
than the lower pleasures, those of the senses.
An example of the difference intended can probably be 
found most clearly in music. Musicians would be unanimous 
in regarding the pleasure afforded by Beethoven's Fifth 
Symphony as 'higher' than the pleasure afforded by a popular 
ditty. But if it is remembered that the question centres 
round a concrete situation, rather than an abstract entity 
called pleasure; if the function of the instinctive im- 
-pulses as the real springs of action be recalled: and if it 
is realised that the crux of the problem is the nature of 
the tension or incomplete adjustment in the organism which 
it is the business of the response to remove ; then, even in 
the instance given, no difference save one of complexity can 
be detected. It is clear that tensions vary in their degree 
of complexity, and that the removal or 'satisfaction' of one 
tension may be more complete, more adequate, more 'kathartic'.
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to use a term current in Aesthetics, than the removal of a 
simpler tension. The popular ditty, to take our example, has 
a very elementary appeal, and removes a very simple tension.
It satisfies the child, the untrained musician, the sophist- 
-icated person in his moments of relaxation. But the B.eet- 
-hoven symphony presupposes, for its successful appeal, not 
only musical training, but a far wider range of experience in 
general, and removes or decreases tension which is the product 
of a far greater number of incipient impulses. That is why 
it seems to us to give a 'higher' satisfaction. It is 
higher, in the sense that it approximates more nearly to the 
complete removal of the most complex tension. It is this 
fact which is the ground of the conception of 'absolute* or 
'intrinsic' value in aesthetic satisfaction, and it is this 
difference of complexity in the removal of tension which is 
the source of the belief that pleasures differ in kind.
Products of culture, then, such as art and literature and 
music, do not afford in themselves an objective criterion 
of social orders. They afford rather a measure of the degree 
of complexity which those social orders attained. It is 
doubtful, in fact, whether the intrusion of aesthetic ex- 
-perience into the ethical problem is warranted at all. For 
the whole sphere of Art is not so much a primary, self- 
-explanatory reality as a reflection of the social conditions
121
under which a community lives. Art is a form of phantasy 
life, a compensation for the need of conformity to the 
Reality-principle: and its content is always closely related 
to the existing social and economic conditions from which it
is a refuge. Art is in fact secondary --- it may, and does,
affect the primary social life with which Ethics is concerned, 
hut it cannot be substituted for the latter. To enforce 
this truth moralists like Plato have even exaggerated the 
secondariness of Art, and at times subordinated it wholly to 
morality.
2.
Conclusions.
One fact which emerges now from this whole discussion of 
the Chief Good is that the end of social life can be ex- 
-pressed only in terms of life itself. What makes possible 
the greatest security of life for the human species is the 
criterion of better or worse foms of social order. The 
conceptions of 'higher' and 'better' in ethical judgment 
simply refer to the degree of social colouring an action has. 
It is not only the fact of some social reference which de- 
-termines moral significance at all, but it is the amount of 
social reference which determines the degree of moral worth.
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Murder is a more serious offence than drunkenness, because 
murder strikes more effectively at the maintenance of social 
order. It is wrong, we feel, to consider exclusively per- 
-sonal or even exclusively family interests in preference to 
the interests of a wider civic or national group. Again, 
the basis of such international morality as'has been admitted 
to be valid is the implied social reference coinciding with 
the whole of humanity. As Bosanquet points out, in a rather 
different connection, the group in question cannot be limited 
even to present humanity. (Some Suggestions in Bthics, Chap. 
II) It is, in the last resort, the existence of the human 
species which is in question. What subserves this more 
adequately is the ethical criterion by reference to which 
fbetter* and *worse* have meaning.
Another fact which has emerged is that the main clue to 
the nature of life which experience affords is increase of 
complexity, synthesis, integration. The nature of the life- 
-impulse, whatever else it may be, is at least a tendency to 
ever wider and wider integration, to more and more complete 
mastery or assimilation of the physical and social environ- 
-ment in which the impulse has its being. In the whole of 
experience the one general characteristic which reflection 
detects is just this principle of synthesis. Wot only 
thought and action spring from a sense of incompleteness, but
12^
every activity of the mind, even religion and philosophy and 
art, may be said to illustrate this fundamental synthetic 
character of life.
There is, then, no criterion save the biological one, and 
no Chief Good save the existence of the human species. The 
biological significance of pleasure or Happiness accounts for 
the prevalence of the view that Happiness is the end. It 
affords a rough account of the facts, and it is only when 
the exact implications of the view are tested that its in- 
-adequacy is revealed. The cultural products of a society 
illustrate the tendency in life to complexity, and, though 
not in themselves the ultimate end, afford a clue to the kind 
of life the society has attained. The ethical end involves 
self-sacrifice and righteousness on the part of individuals, 
but Duty has no meaning save in reference to the ultimate end 
which social life subserves.
It may seem that to find in life itself the ultimate crit- 
-erion is merely a confession of ignorance. But it is all 
that the facts warrant. The criterion may be made more 
vivid if it is expressed as "the full realisation of human 
capacities", or "the perfection of human character". But 
even these forms, which are the main alternatives to the 
Happiness view sanctioned by Ethics, are just the biological 
criterion over again. It is simplest, and most accurate,
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to recognise only what is essential in the data of morals.
It is clear that moral effort is conditioned by the fact of 
social life, that the content of moral regulations reflects 
the kind of social life a community envisages, that the 
supreme ethical principle is equality of opportunity to live 
and realise their nature on the part of all human beings, 
and that the ultimate end of social life itself is only to 
be conjectured from such indications of the life-impulse as 
experience presents. In the last resort, it is the exist- 
-ence of the human species, with all that is implied in 
human life, that affords a criterion to determine the moral 
worth of all forms of social order.
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Chapter IX.
MORALS AND VALUE.
1.
naturalism in Morals.
It may he urged at this point that the view of morals 
suggested is merely a new form of a long discredited creed, 
that of ^naturalism* in morals, because it reduces to the 
level of mere self-interest or the existence of the species 
or some kind of expediency that which is really above all 
such considerations. Morality, it is often maintained, is 
of intrinsic value, apart from all questions of promoting the 
security of life and the survival of the species. If we 
make morals nothing more than an instrument for the main- 
-tenance of common life, or even for the survival of the 
species, we ignore, it may be said, something of the grandeur, 
the solemnity, of the moral life. Wot only so, but we leave 
unexplained all that emotional intensity and warmth with 
which the moral sentiments are so often associated. It 
seems, in fact, as if, in reducing morality to certain ob- 
-jective conditions of social Reality, analogous to physical 
laws, we may have omitted the one feature of the moral life
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which is most fundamental of all. How, then, can it be 
adequate to reduce morality to the product of merely natural 
factors?
It may be replied to this, in the first instance, that to 
make the existence and maintenance of social life, or the 
survival of the human species, the Ultimate moral end is not 
to have reduced morality to mere expediency. There is no 
implication that morality is something secondary, or sub- 
-ordinate, deriving its value from an end outside its ovm 
nature. What has been implied is that the existence and 
maintenance of social life are to be regarded as the direct, 
the inevitable expression of the nature of the life-impulse 
itself. It is not simply useful, or desirable, or expedient, 
that men should live in groups, and that as a consequence 
moral or cultural or more complex conditions of life should 
be realised. The nature of the life-impulse, we must 
rather say, is such that no other result is conceivable.
Thus, S.Alexander formulates the criterion of the morally 
valuable, in an article on 'Watural Selection in Morals*, as 
the fact that **such a plan of life is adapted to the con- 
-ditions of existence", that under it "society reacts with- 
-out friction upon its surroundings", and "can be in 
equilibrium with itself". This view is evidently somewhat 
similar to the view maintained above, though Alexander does
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not write either in the article quoted or in his ’Moral Order 
and Progress* from a similar psychological background. vVhen, 
therefore, the question is asked, (as by Mackenzie, in crit- 
-icism of Alexander’s position), "Why should we desire that 
society should be in equilibrium with itself?" (Ivianual of 
Ethics, p.252) the sufficient, and the only possible answer 
to the question, is that this is the way life is constituted. 
The nature of life appears from the patterns of its working, 
we have seen, and all that reflection or analysis can do is 
to trace and reconstruct the patterns, not speculate on 
their origin.
It has of course often been emphasised in philosophy that 
social life is the clearest pattern of the life-impulse 
known. Social life, in other words, is the indispensable 
condition of individual development. The character of the 
life-impulse is to realise itself in individuals through ^  
social medium. The ’individual* in isolation is an ab- 
-straction, a fragment torn from its context, the product of 
imaginative construction. Individuality can be expressed 
only in and through the myriad agencies of a social setting. 
Hence whatever moral regulations are essential to the poss- 
-ibility of social life are at the same time essential to the 
possibility of self-development. They cannot be regarded as 
matters of expediency, for that would imply that the
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individual could develop through some alternative means. 
Morality, therefore, is bound up with the very root fact of 
human existence, the ultimate datum of life or experience.
It is a pattern of the working of that persistent effort,
\
that striving after self-maintenance, that nisus or conatus, 
which is the most vivid representation to us of the life- 
-impulse.
This view of morals, then, by no means detracts from the 
intrinsic or absolute value of the moral struggle. On the 
contrary, inasmuch as it makes morality an inevitable outcome 
of the life-impulse, it may be claimed that it provides the 
only legitimate basis on which the sovereign worth of the 
moral struggle can be maintained. For the conception of 
value can be derived, in the last resort, only from the 
fact of life itself.
2.
The Concent of Value.
If we are not to resort to intellectualisa., or mysticism, 
we must be content to find the source of value in human 
experience, and the verbal trappings of philosophical mys- 
-tery with which the conception is so often clothed must be 
discarded. To argue that value is indefinable can only
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mean, in Bosanquet’s phrase, that the structure of valuable 
things has not been analysed. What has value must always 
be an element in human experience. Bosanquet himself re- 
-gards it as thejcharacter of being wanted by a human being; 
what has value is the object of desire, that in which we find 
ourselves affirmed. It has the property of satisfactori- 
-ness. (Suggestions in .Ethics, Chap,III) "We understand",
he writes elsewhere, "that all which is valuable must lie 
within the whole of conscious experience.... We adhere to 
Plato’s conclusion that objects of our likings possess as
much of satisfactoriness -- which we identify with value --
as they possess of reality and trueness." (The Principle of 
Individuality and Value,pp.516-7) This view may be not 
unfairly regarded as an expression, in ethical terms, of the 
biological criterion used above. What enhances or sustains 
life is the ultimate source of the attribution of value.
Similarly, those who have discussed the conception on 
the psychological side reach the same conclusion. The only 
common element which can be detected in all experiences re- 
-garded as of value is "an affective state we call agreeable 
or pleasurable" (Everett, Moral Values, Ghap.y). It is 
bound up with what is known as the pleasure-displeasure 
series. Wundt in this connection tends toi emphasise the 
character of excitement-depression, or tension-relief, v/hile
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Royce speaks of restlessness-quiescence. But the funda- 
-mental fact which is at the root of all these different 
forms of expression is just the biological criterion used 
above. Control of stimulation, satisfaction of impulse, 
relief of tension, are just different ways of describing the 
fundamental activity of the organism, the task which is im- 
-posed upon it by its relation to Reality. It can only be 
with reference to this task and its more or less successful 
prosecution, estimated in terms of maintenance of life, that 
the concept of value can be understood.
Thus Paulsen writes, "If there were no satisfaction and 
its opposite, all striving would cease, and everything would 
be indifferent to us. But what does this mean except that 
feelings of pleasure ultimately determine all distinctions 
of value?" (Paulsen, System of Ethics, pp.256-7) So in 
Lotze, there is a famous passage (Microcosmus, I.p.250) 
where he compares from the standpoint of value a crushed 
worm, writhing in pain, and an angel, with consummate in- 
-telligence, but no feeling, to establish his view that 
value depends on feeling. Feeling in fact is.for Lotze 
"the only source of the judgment of value", and its char- 
-acteristic is just "the apprehension of the value of ob- 
-jects in terms of pleasure and pain", (Henry Jones, The 
Philosophy of Lotze, pp.55,55-4)
But it may be urged, as by Everett, in the work quoted, 
that pleasure or feeling, although an essential element in 
value, is not the whole of value. There is also, it is 
said, an "objectified, ideational aspect".
If we analyse what is meant, however, in this expression, 
it reduces, in the last resort, to no more than a reference 
to Reality. The ultimate condition of the realisation of 
value is of course the real world in which hums,n striving 
takes place. The pleasurable or feeling element in, say, 
day-dreams or hallucinations is not accompanied by this re- 
-ference to Reality, at least directly: and it could be 
plausibly maintained that such psychical activity has no 
direct value in consequence. The organism, in its effort 
to maintain itself, is in relation to a Reality, with laws 
and characteristics of which we have some approximate form- 
-ulations. Impulses or tensions, in other words, have a 
content, and whatever the nature of life may be, it is at 
any rate only known to us in its struggle with a Reality.
If the problem of value be retained on a concrete level of 
organism adapting itself to the conditions of Reality, and 
if pure abstractions be avoided with regard to both 'feeling' 
and 'pleasure' in themselves and with regard to 'ideal con- 
-tent', the ultimate source of value is seen to be none other 
than life itself. As Bosanquet himself concludes, "The
152
world of Reality is the world of values" (Suggestions in 
Ethics, Chap.III).
It follows, then, that if the expression 'absolute value' 
is to have a concrete meaning, it must refer to that which 
directly enhances and sustains the life of the human species. 
In philosophical terms, the judgment of existence is not 
only itself a judgment of value, but is actually the ultimate 
source of all values. The fact of life is the one datum, 
the one whole, the one all-inclusive and all-comprehensive 
being within which every phase of experience lies. The 
implications and full nature of the life-impulse, it has been 
urged, can only be found in the concrete patterns of its 
working, in the embodiments of its activity. The moral 
struggle is a phase of this pattern, in some respects the 
most fundamental phase of all for the understanding or de- 
-ciphering of the pattern. It can legitimately be said, 
therefore, to possess absolute value, or intrinsic worth, 
for the conception of value itself derives from the pattern 
of the vforkings of life, and within that pattern alone has 
meaning. Moral values, in short, are real, are absolute, 
simply because the moral life represents an attempt to 
realise something fundamental in the ultimate fact of human 
existence. This may be 'naturalism' in morals, but it is 
not the reduction of morality to mere expediency: and the
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former set of objections raised at the beginning of this 
chapter are thus seen to have no valid force,
5.
Morals and Moral Emotions.
There was, however, another set of objections raised, to 
the effect that the above interpretation of morality does not 
account for the emotional warmth and intensity with which the 
moral sentiments are suffused. In reply to this, there are 
several factors of psychological and biological interest 
which may be adduced.
(a) The moral sentiments are closely related, for instance, 
in the scheme of McDougall, to that primary emotion which 
accompanies the operation of the parental instinct. This 
'tender emotion', as it is called, is held by McDougall to be 
the ultimate source of altruism and devotion and all those 
unselfish characteristics which go to constitute morality.
The parental instinct, on its receptive and conative sides, 
undergoes a vast extension in the course of human develop- 
-ment. Hot only the sight of one's own helpless offspring, 
but the sight of all weakness and helplessness and suffering 
comes, in time, to evoke the same response. Although, too, 
the instinct was originally maternal, the character has been
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transmitted, partially at least, to men as well. "Parental 
love", McDougall writes, "must always appear an insoluble 
riddle and paradox if we do not recognise this primary 
emotion, deeply rooted in an ancient instinct of vital im- 
-portance to the race", "From this emotion and its impulse 
to cherish and protect spring generosity, gratitude, love, 
pity, true benevolence, and altruistic conduct of every kindj 
in it they have their ma,in and absolutely essential root, 
without which they would not be" (Social Psychology, pp.?0-1). 
It is, then, the specific emotion which marks this instinct 
that gives rise to moral indignation and the other emotional 
adjuncts of the moral judgment. The strength of moral 
feeling, on this view, is rooted in a basis of instinct.
It should perhaps be added that such a view is relevant, 
whatever classification of instincts be adopted. Even if 
McDougall's. scheme be rejected (and there is a growing tend- 
-ency to regard it as somewhat arbitrary) and even if it be 
deemed unwarranted to group under a simple parental instinct 
the various specialised impulses into which this instinct 
subdivides, the significance of the affective or emotional 
element, which is all that is in question here, remains un- 
-altered,
(b) Again, it is noticeable that moral regulations are 
imposed on the growing child at the most impressionable
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period of his life (did not Jowett once remark that the 
origin of morality is in the nursery?), and that they are 
usually associated with feelings of tenderness and love, of 
authority or power on the part of those who hand on the moral 
tradition, of submission and trust on the part of those who 
receive it. All of these feelings delve into the deepest 
soil of psychic life and development. For psychic affect 
attaches itself not only to the original ideas with which it 
was associated, but radiates over a wider field as well. It 
is impossible, in fact, to sift out the emotional elements 
which are attached to morality pure and simple and the elem- 
-ents which are derived from its relation to subjective 
factors. Mill gives an interesting analysis of Conscience, 
which is worth quoting in the present connection# He 
suggests that "in that complex phenomenon as it actually 
exists, the simple fact is in general all encrusted over with 
collateral associations, derived from sympathy, from love, 
and still more from fear... from self-esteem, desire of the 
esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement".
This extreme complication, he points out, "is the origin of 
the sort of mystical character which... is apt to be attrib- 
-uted to the idea of moral obligation" (Utilitarianism, Chap. 
III). It is probable, indeed, that the Ego-Ideal, which 
represents the moral heritage of an individual, and which is
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the rock against which the instinctive impulses fling them- 
-selves, producing conflict, derives very largely from the 
father, or father-substitute: and it is even possible that 
in the emotional relations characteristic of the parental 
tie, in the case of any individual, we may find the clue to 
the emotional quality of his moral reactions in later life.
(c) There is, too, a somewhat speculative suggestion which 
has been worked out by Freud in an essay called "Totem and 
Tabu", which may perhaps be mentioned here. There is, 
according to Freud, a striking analogy between the absolute 
character of the moral.imperative and the nature of strongly 
repressed or unconscious desires. Such unconscious factors, 
as illustrated in neuroses, are quite impervious to conscious 
argument or attack, and exhibit the same categorical quality 
as the command of duty. Is the analogy, then, of deeper 
import? Freud thinks it is, and, from a study of the 
earliest"origins of group life, the primitive family or tribe 
or horde, relates the sense of guilt or sin in man, which is 
the beginning and basis of morality, to antecedents largely 
unconscious, those, namely, belonging to what is called the 
Oedipus Complex. The theory is that the content of this 
Greek myth represents a phase of universal human experience, 
which in the normal adult life of a civilized member of a 
community has been repressed and is unconscious. The
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^immoral* character of the myth rouses an answering echo in 
the Unconscious, and though the individual has long renounced 
consciously the desires which Oedipus realises, he feels a 
vague sense of guilt for which he can offer no explanation in 
terms of conscious life. Freud suggests, in other words, 
that perhaps "the sense of guilt of mankind as a v/hole, which 
is the ultimate source of religion and morality, was acquired 
in the beginnings of history through the Oedipus complex" 
(Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, p.279)*
So much disputed theory is implied in this suggestion that 
it is best not to stress it here. But it points to another 
possible source of the emotional intensity with which the 
moral life is suffused.
(d) Further, if moral regulations are ultimately ex- 
-plicable, as has been maintained, in terms of their survival 
value, it is not difficult to understand how an acquired 
social habit or disposition may have been formed, in the 
course of evolution, (however difficult it may be to under- 
-stand the technical^means by which such a disposition is 
formed or transmitted), which will have, attached to it, a 
certain emotional intensity. For that emotional intensity 
will represent the affective accompaniment of the leading 
instinctive tendencies of the organism, the self-preservative 
instincts. The self can only be preserved, it has been
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shown, in and through a social medium, so that morality, 
which is what makes that social medium possible, comes natur- 
-ally, in time, to take on the tone, the colouring, of the 
self-preservative instincts, that is, the warmth which attache 
to life itself. (The hypothesis of affective tone, which 
can be displaced, and attach itself to dispositions not 
originally accompanying it, is again of course implied.)
(e) Finally, this same relation between morality and the 
life of the group accounts for the close connection between 
morality and religion which the history of man exhibits. 
Religion seems historically to have been the great instrument 
of social control and social cohesion, to have provided an 
external, powerful, and independent support for the sanction 
of those moral regulations essential to the possibility of 
common life. On this view, then, it would seem that morality 
may have acquired some of its emotional character by associat- 
-ion with, or by transference of, that emotional intensity 
which belongs to the religious experience. Religion is thus 
not so much morality tinged with emotion as morality is 
practical necessity endowed with religious emotion.
It is, then, by psychological and biological considerations 
of this kind that the great strength and intensity of the 
moral sentiments can be interpreted. Analysis on these lines 
does not imply in the least that the fundamental importance
159
and worth of the moral life have been weakened. The 
emotional aspect of the moral life i^ a legitimate subject 
for psychological treatment, and constitutes a distinct 
problem altogether from that of the significance of the 
existence at all of moral laws, habits, dispositions. The 
former belongs to the study of individual development, the 
latter touches on the entire history of man and on the value 
and destiny of the human species. 'Haturalism in morals,' 
inasmuch as it offers a setting freed from either mysticism 
or dogmatic rationalism, provides the most adequate basis on 
which the dignity and worth of the moral life can themselves 
be vindicated.
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Chapter X.
MORALS AHD ECOHOmlCS.
1.
Economie Determinism.
It is necessary to return now to the conception which has 
been designated 'Social Reality', and to indicate the relation 
between its moral or cultural content and its economic con- 
-tent. For Social Reality v/as defined above as "the economic, 
moral, and cultural conditions which prevail in the community 
to which the individual belongs", and although the subsequent 
discussion of Reality suggested a modification in one aspect 
of this definition, the fact of both economic and moral con- 
-ditions in Social Reality was not affected. The term 
morals, in fact, has been used throughout the argument in a 
generic sense, to include all the conditions of social life.
It is the legitimacy of this usage which must nov/ be ms.de 
clear. Is it valid to refer to economic conditions as part 
of Social Reality? Are such conditions essential to the 
possibility of social life, and therefore subject to moral 
judgment? Or are they not distinct from morality, independ- 
-ent of it altogether, perhaps themselves the very source of 
morals?
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It is evident that economic conditions can be included 
legitimately under the generic term morals, as that term 
has been defined. For it was shown that morality is bound 
up essentially with the relations between the members of a 
group, and economic conditions, in the last analysis, are 
just relations between members of a group, or between classes 
of individuals within the group. Buying and selling, pro- 
-duction and distribution, whatever else they involve, are at 
least relations between people. Economic conditions, too, 
seem to be a very fundamental part of social life. They 
embody those basic, material means by which the physical 
maintenance of the group is secured and the natural wants of 
the community satisfied. The economic facts seem to be the 
very foundation of social order, that on which moral or 
cultural life is built. There is abundant justification, 
then, for regarding economic conditions as part of Social 
Reality, and indeed a highly important part.
But the problem raised cannot be dismissed by this purely 
arbitrary definition of the conceptions involved. It is 
not sufficient to admit that the economic factor is important, 
Is it not the economic conditions, it may be asked, which 
actually determine the kind of social or cultural life a 
group can realise? Are moral conditions not themselves the 
product of prior economic factors?
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This is the view which, in its more general form, has had 
so many distinguished exponents, and which constitutes what 
is known as the materialistic interpretation of history.
The clearest expression of it, from the economic standpoint, 
is probably that of Karl tjarx, and, in the French writers, 
the view itself is usually described as Economic Determinism. 
The substance of the view is given shortly in the 'Manifesto 
of the Communist Party', a joint production of ïvïarx and 
Engels. The latter, in a subsequent preface to this docu- 
-ment, says that the fundamental proposition which forms its 
nucleus belongs wholly to Marx, and consists of the view that 
"in every historical epoch the prevailing mode of economic 
production and exchange, and the social organisation necess- 
-arily following from it, form trie basis upon which it is 
built up, and from which alone can be explained the political 
and intellectual history of that epoch". In other words, 
history ^is the result of economic facts. Changes in the 
social life of men are caused by changes in the conditions 
of production, "The hand-mill", Marx writes, "will give 
you society with the feudal lord (suzerain); the uLeam-mill 
will give you society with the industrial capitalist" (i/iaix. 
Misery of Philosophy, p,99).
On this view, it is not only legal and political relations 
which reflect the material conditions of life. The method
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of production in material existence "conditions the general 
social, political, and spiritual evolution of life". Marx 
compares his theory, in 'Capital', to that of Darwin. Just 
as Darwin showed how the organs of plants and animals owe 
their character to their utility in sustaining life, or their 
'survival-value', so, Marx suggests, his own theory offers 
an analogous or supplementary account of the importance of 
man's productive organs. It is these that are at the basis 
of all social organisation, and that not only sustain physical 
life, hut condition social relations, mental evolution, and 
even morality and religion. "It is, in reality", Marx 
writes, "much easier to discover by analysis the earthly core 
of the misty creations of religion than it is, conversely, 
to develop from the actual relations of life the correspond- 
-ing celestialised forms of those relations. The latter is 
the only materialistic, and therefore the only scientific 
method" (Capital, English Translation, II.p.567,note).
How if an economic determinism of this kind be accepted 
as the complete and final analysis of the movement of 
history, the whole theory of morals suggested above, with 
its hypothesis of a free, creative capacity of reason in 
man, falls to the ground. Human development would not be 
regarded as the unfolding of a creative, integrative life- 
-tendency, but would become merely the play of vast.
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impersonal, economic forces, in the face of which human 
striving is impotent and the notion of human power a mere 
conceit, Marx does not shrinlc from this conclusion. In 
one place he writes, "ivlen make their own history, but they 
make it not of their own free will, not in conditions chosen 
by themselves: they make it in conditions given and trans- 
-mitted. The tradition of all the ages that are dead weighs 
like a veritable Alpine peak on the brain of the living."©
©
It is curious to find that a similar note of Determinism 
characterises the philosophical speculations of Freud, who, 
like Marx, is of Jewish birth. It is not only that Freud 
emphasises psychological determinism as a postulate of 
method. But in a recent work he writes, "The existence of 
a general impulse towards higher development in the plant 
and animal world can certainly not be established... iviany of 
us will also find it hard to abandon our belief that in man 
himself there dwells an impulse towards perfection, which has 
brought him to his present heights of intellectual prowess 
and ethical sublimation, and from which it might be expected 
that his development into superimn will be ensured. But I 
do not believe in the existence of such an inner impulse, 
and I see no way of preserving this pleasing illusion" ( 
Beyond the Pleasure-Frincipie, p.52).
It is significant also that in the greatest speculative 
Jew of all, Spinoza, it is again just this note of cosmic 
determinism which gives to his creed its distinctive mark. 
Summing up the results of Book I of the Ethics, Spinoza 
writes, "I have shown that God necessarily exists... that 
all things have been predetermined by Him, not, indeed, from 
freedom of will or from absolute good pleasure, but from 
His absolute nature or infinite power".
A suggestion with regard to the significance of this 
Jewish emphasis on Determinism is offered below.
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Is, then, the Marxian interpretation of history warranted? 
Does it follow, because changes in the machinery or teclinique 
of production alter the relations between members of a group, 
that the principles of morality themselves depend on these 
economic changes? May the interpretation not rather be 
that the economic conditions comprise the material setting, 
the medium, within which moral principles seek to find an 
expression, and that this medium is even itself moulded and 
influenced by these moral principles?
The latter view seems much more in accordance with the 
facts. It has been claimed above that there are moral 
principles, conditions essential to the possibility of social 
life: and it is evident that these principles do not operate 
in a vacuum. They are revealed only in a setting or medium ; 
and this setting consists not only of the psychological facts 
relevant to.the human organism, but of the material or 
industrial or economic institutions and relations in the 
group. It is in and through these that moral principles 
are expressed. The economic relations may favour the real- 
-isation of moral principles, or they may prove detrimental 
to such realisation. But they do not create the moral 
principles. The nature of these is independent of changes 
in the setting in which they operate. In large-scale or 
in small-scale production it is still a fundamental principle
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of morality that all should have equal opportunity. It 
may he admitted that the extent to which equality can be 
realised in a community depends on the kind of economic 
system that community has devised. But equality itself, 
and all the principles of morality, as fundamental to the 
very existence of social life, are legitimately regarded as 
objective and universal, independent of changes in the medium 
in which they find partial expression.
There is, in short, confusion in the mrxian analysis 
between (a) the system of industrial or economic institutions 
and the relationships involved in these, and (b) fundamental 
principles, moral relationships, conditions essential to 
social life. Ho doubt changes in the machinery of product- 
-ion affect the degree to which morality can be realised.
Such changes usually involve transition from one system of 
relationships to another. But what morality signifies is 
not merely the kind of actual relationships which do in fact 
subsist in some particular community at some particular stage 
of development, but those basic principles, such as security 
.of life, regulation of sex-impulses, equality of opportunity, 
which are, in the last analysis, the necessary conditions 
of the survival of the human species. If economic changes 
make the realisation of these principles difficult, perhaps 
impossible, the society will perish sooner or later. For
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moral principles are the essential conditions of social 
wellbeing, and must be distinguished, as has been shorn 
above, from their formulations, their approximations, their 
partial or inadequate expression, which reflect the economic 
and psychological setting characteristic of some particular 
epoch. If the nature of morality itself, of these moral 
principles, can be explained at all, it can only be by re- 
-ferenoe to the nature of the human organism, and to the 
nature of the life-tendency or nisus. All that the economic 
milieu affects is the degree or extent to which morality can
be effectively embodied, in some concrete form of social or
©
common life.
The suggestion may be offered here that the general em- 
-phasis on Determinism is connected with, and perhaps char- 
-acteristic of, what might be called the Jewish 'Weltan- 
-schauung:. It can scarcely be without significance that 
Spinoza, Marx, and Freud, who are the apostles of the creed 
in the cosmic sphere, the sphere of history, and the sphere 
of mind, respectively, are all Jewish by birth and race. 
Although the two former were outcasts, in a sense, there is 
good evidence for the belief that the characteristics of a 
people's genius are specially well-marked in its renegades.
The Jews, as the people of Religion, of Law, have an 
innate tendency to the deterministic attitude. For the 
essence of the religious outlook is submission to external 
powers and the attitude which stresses human impotence and 
helplessness as compared with the divine omnipotence.
May it not be that philosophical Determinism, in the 
instances mentioned, represents merely a substituted outlet
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for this innate religious disposition? It is certainly 
noteworthy that the doctrine of each of these thinkers has 
been received more as a religious gospel than anything else. 
Renan refers to the Spinozistic creed as the "truest vision 
ever had of G-od". Caird and Santayana both refer to the 
strongly marked Hebraistic tone of Spinoza's philosophy.
"The impulse to speculative enquiry in Spinoza", Caird writes, 
is identical, or in close analogy,with that which in the 
history of mankind has been the origin and secret nerve of 
what we mean by the word 'religion'" (Caird, Spinoza, p.2^ ).
One of the most puzzling conceptions in Spinoza, that of 
"infinite modes", goes back really to Philo-Judaeus, the Jev/isL 
Alexandrian philosopher and contemporary of Jesus, though 
the source of Spinoza's acquaintance with Philo's works is 
unknown to the present writer. Possibly the Jewish Talmudic 
and Cabbalistic literature, in which Spinoza was of course 
versed as a youth, offers a connecting link.
Again, Marxism has been promulgated with a fervour more 
appropriate to a new salvation than to the sober statement 
of economic facts.■ Even the adherents of Psycho-analysis, 
it has often been remarked, exhibit a kind of religious 
attitude to the work of the taster, and treat outside 
criticism as little less than impious.
Whatever the worth of this suggestion, however, the 
logocal character of the Economic Determinism criticised 
above remains questionable. It is in many respects an in- 
-syance of 'post hoc ergo propter hoc'. It is clear, at 
any rate, that material factors do not produce moral prin- 
-ciples. They are rather, as has been urged, the setting 
or milieu within which these principles find partial and 
inadequate expression.
2 .
Economic and Moral Laws.
The history of economic development, and the growth of 
economic science, confirm this view also. In early, simple 
forms of group life the priority of moral principles is
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taken for granted. Relationships within the family or 
tribe, ties of blood, social factors, constitute the formal 
organisation of the group, and such economic development as 
exists falls under this prior system of relationships. The 
Biblical laws of the Jewish people, for instance,.representing 
to some extent a Patriarchal state of society, definitely 
clothe with a moral colouring many details of economic re- 
-gulation. There is, for instance, the institution of the 
Jubilee, or fiftieth year, (Leviticus, XKV.), and the re- 
-demption of the land. One's near relative, for example, a 
brother, must not be treated as a bond-servant, but only as 
a hired labourer, in the event of his becoming poor. Gomm- 
-ercial transactions are to be conducted on a moral basis.
"If thou sell aught to thy neighbour, or buy aught of thy 
neighbour's hand, ye shall not overreach one the other... 
but thou Shalt be afraid of thy God". (ibid.14,17 ) •
But as economic development progresses, as the wants of 
a community increase, and the means of satisfying these wants 
become more highly organised and specialised, the distinction 
between moral and economic factors makes itself felt. As 
the order of society grows more complex, the life of large 
numbers of the community is divorced from the soil, and more 
and more individuals assemble in cities. It is then that 
the economic structure of the society undergoes its most
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searching and critical test. If it does not allow adequate 
expression for those moral principles which are essential to 
the possibility of social life, the society gradually dis- 
-integrates and collapses. This, apparently, is one of the 
factors which contributed to the fall of Rome. In so far 
as the causes of that decline were internal, due to the 
failure of life in the community, they can be most probably 
attributed to economic factors, to the destructive effects 
of an economic development which had lost sight of the moral 
principles essential to social life. The Romans themselves 
seem to have been partly conscious of this, in the later 
days of the Republic. But the reforms proposed were too 
late to check the forces of disintegration.
Why is it that economic or industrial complexity should 
prove fatal to social life on a large scale? Apparently 
the task of maintaining a great community makes a constantly 
increasing strain or exaction on the moral qualities of the 
individuals who compose that community. Men are moral, that 
is, reasonable with regard to social life, up to a certain 
point. In a comparatively simple economic structure, of 
a mainly agrarian type, that point is not exceeded. The 
conditions of life are such that individual maintenance and 
social needs prove easily harmonised, and no excessive calls 
are made on the unselfishness, the moral reasonableness, of
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t h e  individual. The persistence of a system such as that 
of China through so many centuries is probably due to factors 
of this kind. The government, Professor Douglas writes,
"may be described as a patriarchal despotism... All this 
carries us back to a very primitive state of society, to one 
which probably existed among the Chinese immigrants who first 
settled on the plains of China, and which has been perpetuated 
down to the present day unaltered and without interruption." 
The case of the Jewish people might be said to provide a 
'negative instance' of what has been suggested, for internal 
economic pressure has been absent in their modern wanderings, 
and they have not suffered the accompanying decline in life.
It seems, in short, as if there are fundamental moral 
principles necessary for social life: that as a society in- 
-creases in numbers its first task, that of maintaining it- 
-self in food, involves the construction in most cases of a 
complex economic system: that in the working of this system 
loopholes are offered for the expression of man's selfish, 
or unreasonable, impulses, to a degree that he cannot resist: 
tnat as a result the economic structure becomes topheavy, 
subversive of those fundamental moral principles essential 
to social life: and that, when this has reached a certain 
point, the society is unable to defend itself against attack 
from without, and eventually collapses. It is clear, thus.
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that Ma.rx and the Economic Determinists did point out a 
tremendously important factor in human history. But the 
relation between the economic and the moral is not the causax 
one suggested by I/larx. It is rather, as has Jus o been in- 
-dioated, a relation of structure on basis.
In the latest experiment of humanity in cultural or 
civilized life, the Etiro-American or Western type, the clash 
between economic development and fundamental moral principles 
has reached such an acute stage that its removal constitutes 
now the most urgent problem for practical statesmanship.
When the first symptoms of the disease were noticed, in its 
present phase, its progress was stayed by an era of Colonial 
expansion. But even the beginnings of economic science point 
to an implicit recognition of the malady. For the movement 
associated with the French Physiocrats of the eighteenth 
century, with its doctrines of freedom of trade and industrial 
life, culminating in the policy of laisser-faire, v/as at 
bottom an attempt to re-introduce moral principles into the 
sphere of economic life. Let there be 'natural liberty', 
let all individuals have equal opportunity, let there be 
perfectly free competition, let natural forces regulate human 
life, these were the morally unimpeachable sentiments which 
inspired the doctrine. A background of this kind is char- 
-acteristio of Adam Smith himself, and, in a limited way and
with reference to the special problems discussed by each, of
Ricardo and Maithus.
The economic results, however, have outpaced the capacity 
of man's moral powers to handle and control them. As 
economic progress entered upon its present phase, and as the 
extraordinary effects of the Industrial Revolution were 
embodied in large scale production, in factory towns, in 
huge modern cities divorced from any tradition or any con- 
-tact with the soil, the economic structure of society, and 
the relationships within it, overshadowed, and left far in 
the background, those fundamental moral principles on which 
the possibility of social life rests. The unreasonableness 
of human beings, that is, the impulses which prompt to greed 
and selfishness, to power and egoism, to individual agg- 
-randisement, received an opportunity they could not resist, 
and moral sentiments have been almost submerged beneath the 
colossal structure of economic production. Dazzled by the 
tools which invention placed in their hands, men concent- 
-rated on mass production, leaving the human or moral re- 
-lationships incidental to this development to look after 
themselves, or to adjust themselves in the course of time 
by some divine providence.
The moral consciousness of men, however, has to some 
extent been roused now to the dangers in the situation.
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It is true that at first economic science interpreted the 
facts somewhat narrowly. The fiction of a 'purely economic' 
man was invoked, a being who acts, that is, wholly from self- 
-interest, and who, in his business life, is completely immune 
from the considerations involved in moral or human relation- 
-ships. The fallacy in this, however,.was soon evident.
Such an 'economic' man is only an abstraction. The conduct 
of business is never wholly divorced from moral considerations. 
A reputation for honesty, 'good-will', are economic assets of 
considerable worth, and even the most unscrupulous profiteer 
or employer recognises that there is some limit necessary 
even to the expression of his impulses towards self- 
-a ggrand isernent.
This does not imply, of course, that economic science 
should be a branch of Ethics, or that there is no justific- 
-ation for the attempt of economic science to isolate that 
aspect of human behaviour and human relationships with which 
it is concerned. On the contrary, since economic science 
is a construction of social life or of human relationships 
from a definite aspect, its very abstraction enables it to 
envisage its problems and state the terms of their solutions 
more simply and more exactly than would otherwise be possible. 
But what has to be remembered is that economic laws refer 
only to that abstract simplification of social life with
which the economist deals. . In problems which are social, 
an element of uncertainty must enter into the economist's 
conclusions. Factors of psychological and ethical import 
have been ignored, and necessarily ignored. But they 
affect the conclusions nevertheless. The Capital Levy, 
for instance, which is at present the practical policy of 
one section of British Parliamentarians, may not be econ- 
-omically feasible, (though the evidence is so conflicting 
that no opinion is of much worth), but it is generally agree, 
that the psychological effects of the proposal to introduce 
the scheme might very well prove fatal to it at the outset. 
In a word, although it is an 'economic' problem, the main 
source of its appeal is its moral aspect, and the weakness 
of the project is largely psychological, that is, the way 
in which owners of large amounts of capital will react to 
the new situation.
The limitation of the purely economic standpoint, then, 
is admittedly necessary for certain purposes. But that 
limitation must be recognised in the attempt to solve con- 
-orete problems of government. It is significant, at any 
rate, that v/e find in recent economic doctrine itself more 
and more recognition of the importance of the moral basis 
of social life. This moral renaissance now centres very 
largely round the problem of Distribution, rather than, as
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in Ruskin and the earlier writers, on the demoralising 
effects of mass-production and the division of labour. The 
glaring inequalities which have attended the growth of modern 
economic methods and tendencies have reached the stage of 
constituting a festering sore in the social body. Every 
other problem of social reform depends for its solution to 
some extent on the problem of Distribution, and it is not 
perhaps too much to say that the survival of Western culture 
itself is bound up with the possibility of reconciling 
economic distribution with the principles of morality 
essential to social life.
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Chapter XI. 
the RATIONAL TRADITION IN ETHICS,.
1.
Socratic Ethics..
If the view of morals suggested above is now compared 
with some of the traditional theories in the history of 
Ethics which it resembles, such comparison will serve to 
elucidate the exact implications of the present view and will 
throw light on the problems which these traditional views 
fail to solve. In the first place, the view that it is 
reason which is the capacity concerned in moral matters goes 
back to the classical doctrine of the Greeks. Even before 
the time of Socrates there seems to have been a strongly- 
-marked intellectual tone aoout Greek moral theory, Homer 
and Herodotus, the lyric poets and the dramatists, often 
refer to sin as a kind of mental blindness. "The essence 
of sin", Adam writes, with reference to Homer, " i B  
self-seeking, or self-assertion... It would appear to be a 
breach of the golden law of moderation.... The sinnei is a 
fool or a madman, rather than a knave."(Adam, The Religious 
Teachers of Greece, p.^ 0). Similarly, in Pindar, sin is
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again egoism, induced in a man not so much by Zeus or Fate, 
as by himself. In Aeschylus, sin is "a kind of disease or
/ j ^
m a d n e s s , Pers.7,92) which fastens on the soul of 
the sinner, confounding his intelligence so that he can no 
longer discriminate between right and wrong" ( ibid.p. 14j? ).
It is in Socrates, however, that the view becomes most 
explicit. That virtue is knowledge, and vice ignorance, 
constitutes indeed the most characteristic feature of 
Socratic Ethics, Thus in the Protagoras Socrates says,
"You have admitted that men err in their cnoice of pleasures 
and pains, that is, in their choice of good and evil, from 
defect of knowledge... and you are also aware that the erring 
act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance" 
(Protagoras, p.3^ 7)* In other words, there is, on this 
view, no native viciousness in human beings. Their wicked- 
-ness springs simply from lack of sufficient knowledge,
"No man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to 
be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature: and 
when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one 
will choose the greater when he may have the less" (ibid.p. 
3^ 8). Again, in the Euthydemus, Socrates asks the two dis- 
-tinguished" Sophists, "Can you make a good man...even of one 
who is not convinced" (that is, convinced that he ought to 
learn of them)"either because he imagines that virtue is a
1^9
thing which cannot be taught at all, or that you are not the 
teachers of it? Has your art power to persuade him that 
virtue can be taught?" The Sophists,(Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus), answer emphatically in the affirmative. 
(Euthydemus, p.274) In short, Socrates seems to have held 
that the 'good' act presupposes knowledge, and that where 
there is knowledge the good act inevitably follows, a native 
tendency for goodness being assumed to be inherent in all 
mankind. Socratic moral doctrine has thus quite definitely 
an intellectual colouring.
The main criticism that has been directed against the view 
of Socrates is twofold. As a fact of ordinary experience, 
to know the good, or the right course of action, does not 
always lead to its execution in practice. 'Video meliora 
proboque, détériora sequor', is the oft-quoted line in this 
connection. Only the exigencies of an abstract theory, it 
seems, can m8,ke it possible to gloss over such an obvious 
contradiction. In the second place, if virtue is knowledge, 
what kind of knowledge is it? In Socratic doctrine virtue 
and knowledge seem to be nothing but abstract conceptions, 
definable simply in terms of each other. What is the con- 
-crete content of that knowledge which is knowledge of the 
good, or virtue?
With regard to the former criticism, that know.ledge of
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what is right does not always lead to right action, it may 
be admitted at once that the fact is indisputable. But the 
Socratic paradoxes rest on a purely abstract, unreal concept- 
-ion of knowledge. It is implied that reason, or knowledge, 
is something fixed, complete, comprehensive, so that a man is 
said to be reasonable, or to have knowledge, with the implic- 
-ation that he necessarily, in all circumstances, acts with 
the maximum of reasonableness. The difficulty that then 
emerges is simply a logical or.intellectual one, having no 
real ground in the actual experience from which the concept- 
-ions have been formed.
On the view which has been maintained above, reason is not 
something fixed or complete. It does not reach its full 
stature at birth. It is rather a capacity which grows and 
develops, which can be graded according to its degree of com- 
-plexity, its power of integration or synthesis. It very 
often, however, breaks down, as it were, or falls short of 
the ideal, the maximum degree of reasonableness. There is, 
then, no paradox in the fact that we may know what is right 
and not do it. The strength of certain instinctive impulses 
is so great, we saw, that reason, or the effort to grasp the 
conditions of social Reality, is sometimes overpowered. The 
fact which Ovid describes in the line quoted above simply 
means that an impulse which urges to its immediate satisfaction
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is preferred to one which is compatible with the wider con- 
-text of social claims. Reason functions within limits, 
limits which are set by the nature of the organism and the 
past experience of the individual. It is mere abstraction 
or intellectualism to imagine that because moral action is 
reasonable no immoral action is ever possible to a rational 
being.
Similarly, the necessary corollary of the Socratic theory, 
that all men always desire the good, and that voluntary action 
is invariably a choice of ends conceived as good, rests on 
the same abstract sense of the concept knowledge. The ana- 
-lysis of behaviour which was suggested above is.rather that 
the facts of Reality enforce a modification of the native 
i^ leasure-principle in men, and that in virtue of the capacity 
known as reason control of impulses is possible and conformity 
to the Reality-principle, that is, to moral regulations, is 
attainable. It cannot be maintained^a moment, in the face 
of ordinary every-day experience, that no conflict of im- 
-pulses ever takes place, or that whatever is desired is in- 
-variably good. Even the more subtle psychology which reads 
Green into Socrates, and finds in self-satisfaction the end 
behind all action, may fall into a very similar abstraction. 
For satisfaction as a fixed entity is misleading. The 
satisfaction of an impulse is coloured by the nature of the
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impulse whose satisfaction it is. If the level of the ana- 
-lysis be retained in its concrete form, as that of an 
organism with myriads of tensions or impulses seeking to 
resolve these tensions or to satisfy these impulses, the 
nature of reason or knowledge must also be expressed in con- 
-crete terms. It is, in fact, simply not the case that all 
men always desire the good. They seek to satisfy their im- 
-pulses, and can seek this in a more or less immediate way: 
and their resultant behaviour can be described as more or less 
reasonable or moral. But there is nothing in this psych- 
-ological analysis of the springs of action which is in- 
-compatible with the view that moral action is reasonable.
The paradoxes of the Socratic position, in short, follow 
altogether from the abstract conceptions of knowledge and 
virtue which they imply.
With regard to the second criticism noted above, that 
there is no concrete indication of the kind of knowledge that 
Socratic, virtue means, (Zeller's criticism, for instance), 
it is clear that on the view suggested here this defect can 
be remedied.^  Socratic knowledge may be admittedly a vague 
something, incapable of definition except in terms of what 
it is itself supposed to explain. But the knowledge which 
is morality is knowledge of the conditions of social life, 
knowledge of social Reality. The sphere in which reason
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operates, from the moral standpoint, is the sphere of social 
and cultural conditions. Insight into these conditions, 
appreciation of what is essential to the possibility of social 
life and the ultimate survival of the species, constitutes the 
knowledge which is specifically moral.
Those commentators who have tried to reach the kernel of 
truth in the Socratic doctrine without sacrificing the shell 
of abstract intellectualism by which it is surrounded have 
been compelled to read into his view something of the kind 
just indicated. Socrates meant by knowledge, we are told, 
not a theoretical, intellectual process, but a comprehensive 
principle dominating the entire personality. Adam writes, 
for instance, of Socratic knowledge, that "It is a certain 
overmastering principle or power that lays hold primarily 
indeed of the intellect, but through the intellect of the 
entire.personality, moulding and disciplining the will and the 
emotions into absolute union with itself." (Religious Teachers 
of Greece, p.^ 29). This is simply to suggest the character 
of reason, in the sense used above. Or some more doubtful 
psychological analysis is ventured, to the effect that ideas 
are forces, not merely theoretical, passive entities: a creed
which apparently has inspired much of the popular 'New Thought' 
in America. Again, Fouillee points out that knowledge for 
Socrates is "knowledge of the real and absolute worth of
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things" (Quoted by Boutroux, Essays, p. 4^). This is what 
has been expressed above as social Reality, as that which a 
person is enabled by reason to grasp of those social or morax 
conditions which form an integral feature of Reality for 
members of civilized groups.
It is thus possible, if we place the Socratic doctrine in 
a modern psychological setting, to interpret it for what it 
is, namely, a statement of the fundamental nature of morality. 
Its formalism, its extravagance of expression, its narrow 
intellectualism, cannot wholly obscure the truth which it 
contains, namely, its emphasis on the place of reason or 
knowledge in morals.
The Nature-Convention Antithesis.
Another feature of Greek Ethics on which some light can 
now be thrown is their antithesis between Nature and Con- 
-ventlon. That antithesis goes back almost to the beginn- 
-ings of Greek speculative thought. It was the problem of 
the earliest physicists to discover Nature in its primary 
elements, and the opposition of Nature to Convention appears 
as an integral part of the physics of Democritus. In Ethics 
the antithesis becomes specially prominent aoout the time of
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the Sophists, and seems to have been part of the intellectual 
currency of that age. At a later period, Aristotle himself 
makes use of it, referring, in a well-known passage of the 
Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, to the distinction 
between 'natural' and 'conventional' justice. "Natural 
justice? he writes, "is that which has the same validity 
everywhere, and oes not depend on our accepting or rejecting 
it" (Ethics, V.7.I).
The significance of this antithesis would seem to lie in 
a certain vague recognition which it implies of the two 
aspects of Reality, described above as physical and social. 
Moral regulations, or the conditions of social life, come to 
be interpreted as something superimposed on physical nature, 
or Reality proper. They seem to constitute an additional 
structure, bound up with the emergence, in the history of man, 
of group or common life. It becomes tempting and plausible 
to stress their difference from those features of Reality 
which seem to have been there from the beginning. It is in 
this way that the antithesis of Nature (that is. Reality whicn 
is independent of human agency) and Convention (that is. 
Reality which is the more complicated instrument of social 
life) should be interpreted. It points to an important dis- 
-tinction, that between the physical and social aspects of 
Reality.
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The inferences which the Sophists themselves seem to 
have drawn from their formulation of the antithesis are not 
warranted, it should be added. We may admit that there are 
two distinguishable aspects of Reality, physical and social, 
but this does not in the least imply that moral regulations 
are conventional, in the sense that they are mere arbitrary 
contrivances of human ingenuity, which perhaps subserve the 
interests of the ruling class, and could be quite well other 
than they are. It has been shown above that there are moral 
conditions of social life, which can be regarded as objective, 
universal, real, in the same sense as are physical laws.
Moral laws are the conditions essential to the very possib- 
-ility of social life, not mere capricious fiats of a part- 
-icular tyrant or class. Convention, so far from being an 
arbitrary super-structure on Nature, is a more complex phase 
of Nature, a fuller, completer expression of it.
It was just to bring out this Reality in social life, the 
Reality of moral principles or regulations, that the whole 
argument of Plato in the Republic was directed. He is 
attempting.to set out the nature of justice in itself, apart 
from all questions of rewards and consequences, and to show, 
by a detailed, logical analysis of what is implied in social 
life, that morality is the flowering, the consumma.tion of 
man's being, and as such 'natural' or real.
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Similarly, the form which the antithesis of Nature and 
Convention assumes in eighteenth century thought, and espec- 
-ially in Rousseau, with its implied contempt for convent- 
-ional institutions and civilization, is evidently sheer 
extravagance. Not only does it rest on the historical fict- 
-ion of a golden age in tne past, but it glorifies instinctive 
impulses, which are the commonest possessions of human beings, 
as if they were the rarest and most unique treasures in all 
his heritage. Everything we know about humanity and its 
evolution runs counter to such a view. It seems indisputable 
that social life is itself the 'natural' condition of man, at 
a certain stage of development, and that moral regulations,or 
conventions, which are the essentials of social life, are 
therefore as natural as physical laws. Mian discovers both, 
we have argued, by the exercise of the same capacity, reason.
The whole antithesis, in short, between Nature and Con- 
-vention can only be freed from its extravagant consequences 
if the exact basis on which it rests, the distinction between 
physical and social Reality, is made explicit. But that the 
antithesis does point to a fundamental distinction of this 
kind seems testified not only by the constant recurrence of 
the conceptions in the history of ethical and political 
thought, but by the extreme plausibility of the arguments to 
which they have prompted.
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3.
Aristotle.
Some of the most important features of the view suggested 
in the present analysis can be read, too, into Aristotle's 
position without unwarranted or arbitrary interpretation.
He seems, for instance, to have expounded a view of pleasure 
which suggests its biological significance# "The fact , he 
writes, "that all creatures, whether beasts or men, pursue 
pleasure is a proof that in some sense pleasure is the Chief 
Good.... There is a kind of instinct which all creatures 
possess by nature" (Nicomachean Ethics, Burnet's Text, VII. 
13,1133b). Confirming one of the arguments of Eudoxus,(that 
an object at which all things aim is a good), Aristotle pointe 
out that it is not only irrational creatures who yearn for 
pleasure, but rational creatures have the same impulses. (X.
2. 1172b)
He shows, too, that 'pleasure' is not an entity in itself 
so much as an accompaniment or completion. Strictly, all 
creatures do not aim at pleasure, but at life, or activity, 
and the pleasure is the completion of the activity. "Pleasure 
follows in the train of every sensation, and similarly of 
every process of thought or perception, and the most pleas- 
-urable activity is that which is most complete" (X.4.1174b).
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"All men strive after pleasure, because all are eager simply 
to live. Life is, so to speak, an activity, or exercise of 
faculties... and in every case it is pleasure which makes 
perfect the exercise of the faculties, and therefore life.
It is natural that men should strive after pleasure, because 
it perfects a man's life, which is the object of desire" (X. 
4.1173a). These quotations show clearly that Aristotle 
accepts the biological significance of pleasure, and that the 
analysis suggested above corresponds in essetials to the 
position of Aristotle in this respect.
Similarly, the msnn doctrine of Aristotle is that the 
Chief Good, which can be popularly described as Happiness, 
consists in the activity appropriate to man as a rational 
being. The activity of reason, in other words, is Virtue. 
'Right Reason', he says, determines on each occasion the mean, 
that is, the ideal in action. In Book VI of the Ethics the 
nature of this Right Reason is defined more exactly. The 
psychological background from which Aristotle proceeds is 
of course different from that outlined above, but it is at 
least significant that the specific characteristics of Right 
Reason which he enumerates are (a) Good Counsel, that is, 
deliberation with regard to the adjustment of means to end,
(b) Intelligence or Discrimination, that is, literally, the 
knack of putting things together, and (c) Judgment, or Common
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Sense, or Considerateness, which means, as knirhead points 
out, the recognition that life is social, that one's own 
individual or personal detachment should be subordinciced to 
a common end, "the power", to quote Muirhead, "of instinct- 
-ively perceiving what is required in the interests of the 
community" (Chapters from Aristotle's Ethics). It is just 
exactly these characteristics of reason which have been shown 
above to mark the capacity of conforming to Reality, in its 
social as well as its physical aspect, and to constitute the
essence of moral behaviour.
The view of Aristotle, too, that the data of Ethics are 
not capable of the same rigorous treatment as, say, the data 
of mathematical science, does not mean that no social science 
is possible. It means that the conclusions reached in tnis 
sphere are to be regarded as merely probable, general rules, 
liable to exceptions as knowledge increases and expeiience i^- 
enriched. In other words, Aristotle points to what has 
been represented above as the distinction between tne actual 
moral currency of an age and the real, or ideal, social con- 
-ditions which form the ultiimte content oi moraliuy. Again, 
the broad distinction in the Ethics between moral and in- 
-tellectual excellences corresponds to the different spheres 
of reasonableness, social and physical Reality, suggested 
above. Aristotle himself is conscious of the analogy
1?1
between the two spheres, for he indicates in a general way 
that the development of moral excellence from appétition or 
desire is parallel to the development of knowledge from the 
senses.
But, apart from points of detailed correspondence, the 
empirical tone of the classical treatise on Ethics amply 
vindicates the concrete standpoint maintained throughout.
The insight and sanity of Greek Ethics, the implicit ident- 
-ification in Plato and Aristotle of social and personal 
wellbeing, the correlation of moral excellence or virtue with 
the specific function of man's nature as a rational being, 
stand, out as permanent landmarks in the history of moral 
speculation: and no view of morals is likely to withstand 
for long critical analysis or scrutiny if it departs wholly 
from the Greek tradition, or if it fails to incorporate in 
itself the fundamental truths which are the legacy of Greek 
philosophy.
4 .
Spinoza.
With the philosophy of the Renaissance the new conception 
of the world and the new science are at first more prominent 
than speculation on morals. Mention may perhaps be made,
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however, of the martyr Bruno,( 1 ^ 48-1600 ), who has left tv/o 
symbolical works, "The Expulsion of the Beast Triumphant", 
and "On the Heroic Affects", which have considerable ethical 
interest, Binino emphasises the place of striving in the 
moral life, and the constant disproportion between attainment 
and ideal or absolute satisfaction. He suggests, too, that 
complexity is the criterion by which the liie of feeling is 
to be measured, a view which, in a rather different sense, 
was elaborated above. But it is in Spinoza that the iunda- 
-mental importance of Ethics is first clearly emphasised in 
modern speculation. It is in this thinker, indeed, tnat the 
relation between Ethics and Metaphysics is logical]/ and 
ruthlessly carried out in its deepest implication.
Spinoza assumes at the outset, it may perhaps be useful 
to recall, that tie conception of Reality can best be treated 
as analogous to the conception of Space, and that moral 
questions can in this way be discussed with the same cogency 
and logical certainty of result as can questions of physical 
or mathematical science. He never imagines for a moment 
that he is straining his material into an unnatural form.
It is assumed throughout that questions such as those of 
freedom, immortality, the Chief Good, can be expounded acc- 
-ording to the method of geometry, with definitions, axioms, 
propositions, and corollaries. How, however extravagant
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this assumption may at first sight seem, there is a certain 
truth, it has been argued, above, in the view that there are 
mbral laws, as objective and necessary as the laws of physical 
science, and a certain fruitfulness in the distinction of two 
aspects of Reality, one physical and one social. It seems 
best, therefore, to try and reach the substance of Spinoza's 
ethical doctrine, behind its curious form, without stopping 
to criticise his method of exposition.
The world, as it presents itself to Spinoza's vision, is 
shot through and through with necessity. It is the express- 
-ion of order, law, system: and everything is what it is, not 
as the result of chance, or to serve some special purpose or 
design of an external creator, but simply because of its 
nature. The end of human life, therefore, for Spinoza is 
the development of the active side of a man's nature. "All 
things which are made", he writes in an early work, "are made 
according to the eternal order and the fixed laws of nature". 
But human knowledge is incomplete, and the conception of a 
human nature "more firm than one's own" leads to striving 
after such a nature. The Chief Good, then, is simply know- 
-1 edge which has grasped the ultima.te truth of things, "the 
union of the mind with the whole of nature" (On the Correct- 
-ion of the Understanding, 11.12).
The completion of the self is thus for Spinoza a process
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of knowledge* Knowledge and morality are indeed for him 
aspects of one movement. In his system there is the closest 
correspondence between the successive stages of knowledge and 
the successive stages of the moral life. Just as a person 
passes from 'vague experience*, or the stage of accidental 
and arbitrary associations, through Reason, the stage where 
objects are perceived to express permanent and necessary laws, 
up to Intuition, when the whole universe is glimpsed as the 
expression of one immanent Being: so, in the moral struggle, 
the individual passes from slavery or bondage, the bondage 
of impulse and passion, through Reason, where the trammels 
of sense and passion are first overcome, up to true Freedom, 
where the identity of the self with the one Reality or God 
is intuitively grasped. Adequate knowledge and the con- 
—summation of the moral life are, in-the last analysis, one 
and the same ideal, the harmony and identity of the self 
with God,
Indeed knowledge and morality are virtually the same, 
according to one phase of Spinoza's view, "bill and under- 
-standing", he writes, "are one and the same,,, A particular 
volition and a particular idea are one and the same" (Ethics, 
ii. 4 9 , corollary). There is sufficient testimony, then, in 
Spinoza's system for the analogy, and virtual identity, of 
moral and intellectual progress maintained above.
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The foundation of Ethics, too, is for Spinoza "the en- 
-deavour wherewith a thing perseveres in its own being", that 
is, a self-realising impulse which in the next sentence is 
identified with the "actual essence of a thing" (Ethics, iii. 
6). It seems legitimate to interpret Spinoza's view in the 
sense maintained above, that social life, where morality 
emerges and where alone it has meaning, is the natural, the 
inevitable expression of the life-impulse, and that moral laws 
are therefore formulations of Reality,.
Further, in Book Three of the Ethics, Spinoza definitely 
suggests the biological significance of feelings, and of 
pleasure and pain, which forms almost the basis of the pre- 
-sent theory, "The mind", he writes, "can suffer great 
changes, and can pass now to a state of greater or less per- 
-fection; these passions explain to us the emotions of 
pleasure and pain. In the following propositions I shall 
understand by pleasure the passion by which the mind passes 
to a higher state of perfection, and by pain the passion by 
which it passes to a lower state of perfection" (Ethics, iii. 
prop, XI,note). The function of the mind is to imagine
"those things which increase or help its power of acting" 
(prop.XII), It is clear, too, that Spinoza does not argue 
from an abstract conception of pleasure, but recognises its 
adjectival character. "There are", he writes, "as many
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species of pleasure, pain.,, as there are species of objects 
by which we are affected" (prop.lVI), "The pleasure which 
arises from the object, e.g.A, involves the nature of the 
object A, and the pleasure which arises from the object, B, 
involves the nature of that object B" (ibid.).
The general standpoint of Spinoza's system is thus seen 
to be in harmony with the view which equates reason and morals, 
in the above sense, and finds the ultimate end of morality 
in the concrete working of life itself. Although opinoza's 
exposition is so abstract, he admits that within the actual 
context of human striving there is a concrete 'type' of ideal 
human nature, by which more or less in goodness can be estim- 
-ated. This perfection, which he calls Reality, corresponds 
to what was called above social Reality, or the essential 
conditions of social life. His final statement of the 
nature of morality, thnt "Virtue is the essence itself of 
man in so far as it has the power of effecting certain things 
which can be understood through the laws of its nature alone", 
(Ethics, IV.def.8), points simply to the view that social 
life involves morality, and that since social life expresses 
the nature of man, morality likewise is in the. nature or 
order of things. This is the view which has been urged 
above, if from^ rather different approach, and from perhaps 
a different set of data.
r/7
3.
Kant.
The rational or intellectual view of morality culminates 
in Kant, For Kant's ethical doctrine is not an isolated 
one, hut, as Caird says, "the final and most explicit ex- 
-pression of a view of the moral life which, in some form or 
other, has held the balance with Hedonism through the whole 
history of ethical philosophy" (Caird, Philosophy of Kant, 
Il.p.léO). The thesis advanced above, that to be moral is 
to be reasonable, offers a new interpretation of Kant, and 
frees his doctrine from the supposed abstractness or austerity 
it is often held to exhibit. Kant's view is, briefly, that 
the moral law is the law of our own nature, in so, far as we 
are rational beings. He holds that it is reason which in- 
-flexibly ordains the precepts of morality, and that the 
command of duty is binding on all rational creatures as such, 
categorically or unconditionally. The moral lav/ is neither 
the product of experience nor the reflection of some model 
or pattern. It issues from reason itself, and is implied 
in the very conception of a rational being. (Fundamental 
Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, sect.2).
The fact that Kant attributes moral worth only to actions 
done from a sense of duty, and into which no inclination
enters, simply suggests the fundamental sway of the Pleasure- 
-principle in man, and the importance of that effort to con- 
-form to social Reality which is the essential feature of 
the moral struggle. Kant recognised the universal force of 
the pleasure-principle. "It is", he writes, "one and the 
same vital force expressing itself in the desires, which is 
affected by all objects that cause pleasure" (Works, vlii.p. 
1p1). Ka,nt would agree, in short, that to follow the 
pleasure-principle is a fundamental tendency of the human 
mind, that it is, in a sense, a physical or biological law. 
But he does not regard the Reality-principle, and the moral 
behaviour to which it prompts, as a development from the 
pleasure-principle so much as an entirely distinct, new type 
of activity, quite unrelated to the other,pleasure-seeking 
side of man, and springing from a radically different phase 
of human nature. It is in this that the distinctive dualism 
of Kant's whole system is clearly seen, with all its con- 
-sequences of formalism and harshness.
But the analysis of the facts which Kant offers is funda- 
-mentally the same as that attempted above. He points out, 
for instance, that "all material practical principles as such 
are of one and the same kind, and fall under the universal 
principle of self-love or our own happiness "(.Critique of 
Practical Reason, Second Theorem). This is just another
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description of the pleasure-principle. Kant opposes the
notion that pleasures differ in kind. "As it is all one to
him, who uses gold to pay his expenses, whether the gold he 
uses was dug up in the mountains or washed out of the sand, 
so no man who cares solely for the pleasantness of life asks 
whether the pleasant consciousness is due to objects of sense 
or objects of understanding, but only how much pleasure they 
produce and how long it will last" (Quoted in Caird, op.cit. 
II.p.166). All practical principles, therefore, that is, 
all principles of conduct based on personal desire or exper- 
-ience of pleasure, are not objectively necessary, Kant holds 
This, again, is simply to say that the pleasure-principle is 
the very antithesis of morality, and that the essence of the 
moral life is to be found only in what springs from reason, 
that is, from what is real, objective, universal.
Even the famous opening sentence of the Metaphysic of 
Morals, to the effect that there is nothing good in itself 
save the good will, is most simply interpreted as referring 
to what was called above the capacity of being reasonable, 
of following the Reality-principle, of postponing or denying 
the immediate gratification of impulses. For it is in this 
that the 'good will' consists, and it is natural therefore 
that Kant should endow it with such supreme worth. To be 
reasonable, in the sphere of social conditions, is, we have
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seen, the ultimate basis of the very possibility of moral 
conduct. It is only the abstract conception of Reason 
which Kant uses that makes it necessary for him to leave the 
good will without content, except for the bare notion of 
moral obligation.
Kant's view, then, is that moral behaviour expresses 
reason, but he regards reason as an abstract faculty, and 
rigidly severs moral or rational behaviour from activity whicn 
is in the least tainted with sensuous or pleasurable elements. 
The formalism of his view may be admitted. As Hegel showed, 
if the content of the moral principle, that is, of reason, is 
merely the abstract notion of self-consistency, no particular 
rules of action can ever be deduced from it. A formal 
criterion of 'universality' cannot in itself afford the key 
to moral rightness, because any particular rule at all can 
be universalised without formal contradiction. It is. only 
if social life, with rights of life and property and all the 
rest, are presupposed, that Kant's criterion of universal- 
-isation becomes valid.
It may be admitted, too, that Kant is logically unjust- 
-ified in drawing, as he does, on experience at all for his 
illustrations. If reason and experience be opposed in the 
absolute fashion required by Kant's system, the rational, in 
morals as in knowledge, becomes a mere empty form, and the
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moral principle lacks content. But Kant's vision was deeper 
than his surface logic enabled him to express, for, while 
granting that on his own premisses the moral end cannot be 
realised in the sensible or natural world, he shows that we 
must use this natural world as a 'type'. "Hot", Caird says, 
"as though moral laws could be realised in the natural world 
as such, but because it is only in this way that we can re- 
-present them as realised at all" (op.cit.pp.179-I8O).
Kant's analysis, in fact, leads to a view of morals which 
only his initial dualism prevents him recognising. His view 
appears in its real nature if it is freed from the logical 
fetters which it struggles to break. The conceptions of 
reason and experience are in truth not incompatible. The 
rational and the actual are not separate worlds which cannot 
be. related, but phases of a single process. It is in the 
world of actual practice, of experience, that reason can 
alone function and find its material. What reason indicates 
as the moral end is not a bare principle of self-consistency, 
but concrete conditions of social Reality, the conditions 
essential to the realisation of life in social order. From 
this standpoint, and on this view of reason, Kant's doctrine 
is freed from its formal contradictions, and the fundamental 
truth of his analysis appears through the clouds of his 
self-erected obscurities both of logic and of language.
182
6.
Coneluslon.
Even from such a brief glimpse as this, then, at the 
history of Greek and modern Ethics, it is clear that the 
rational tradition represents one of the main elements in 
moral theory. The present analysis has been designed to 
uphold that tradition, and to vindicate the Idealism with 
which that tradition has been so long associated. It is 
an Idealism which has emerged from a background of mixed 
psychological elements, from Psycho-analysis and Behaviorism 
in particular. Taking these for what they are, and even 
straining their results, the analysis has not found it nec- 
-essary to relinquish anything of the essential truth in 
Idealism. Freedom has been maintained at the root of the 
moral life, the supreme worth of the moral struggle has been 
vindicated, and the history of man's cultural development 
has been viewed not as the product of blind physical or 
economic forces, but as the surging of the free, creative 
spirit of man towards the fuller and completer expression 
of its power.
The relation between the rational tradition in morals and 
the Happiness tradition to which it has always been opposed 
can now be viewed in a new light. Emphasis on the fact of
18^
the pleasure-principle, on the fundamental significance, 
biologically, of pleasurable tone, tends to throw into one- 
-sided relief tne aspect of Happiness, until it monopolises 
the entire field of analysis. Emphasis on what is implied 
by the Reality-principle, on the other hand, tends to bring 
into relief the function of Reason in the moral struggle, 
and tends to overshadow or even displace altogether the 
actus,1 impulses and passions and conflicts out of which the 
moral life is built. A purely empirical emphasis and an 
abstract concept of Reason fail to reveal all that is in- 
-volved in the moral situation. The solution must lie in 
an attempt to reconcile the opposed traditions by retaining 
the analysis on that concrete level on which the facts them- 
-selves are found, and by making explicit the postulates 
which these very facts require. Granted that what we are 
dealing with is living organism responding to environmental 
situation, that life itself supplies the clue to morality 
and to values, analysis has shown that the moral struggle 
loses nothing of its fundamental character, and that no 
amount of psychological probings or explanations can interpret 
the significance of the very existence of duty and morality.
What has emerged, finally, is the conviction that moral 
theory must guard against excessive intellectualism, and 
that, if Ethics is to be a progressive science, it must be
184
in the closest relation to the actual setting of the moral 
life. It must absorb into its own analysis the results of 
psychology and^ 'the relevant physical or biological sciences. 
For in this way alone, not by the pure theorising which 
recks of nothing save the implications of logical concepts, 
can the significance of morals be adequately or sanely 
envisaged.
